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I. INTRODUCTION
Popular outrage against “greedy bankers” and the “bonus
culture” on Wall Street has energized a new movement to regulate
banker pay. Yet, concern about banker pay extends beyond Occupy
Wall Street and newspaper editorials, as academics, policymakers,
and even bankers themselves believe that pay practices contributed
to the financial crisis of 2007–2009.1 Bankers receive much of their
1. The Institute for International Finance commissioned an industry survey
in which “98% of survey respondents believe that compensation structures were a
factor underlying the crisis.” INST. OF INT’L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINANCIAL
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ample compensation in bonuses, which are determined by annual
performance. The standard critique argues that poorly designed
bonus plans encouraged bankers to pursue risks that were
inconsistent with long-term shareholder value and the stability of
financial markets.2 Aligning the incentives of bankers with the
interests of their shareholders and society now commands
significant attention from policymakers and academics.3 Some
proposals offer a soft, “principles-based” approach that is unlikely to
do much harm (or good).4 Others, however, would regulate the form
in which bankers are paid.
The basic forms implicated are fairly conventional: current
salaries and bonuses (i.e., paychecks), equity compensation, and
deferred compensation. Equity compensation is usually a grant of
the employer’s stock (e.g., shares worth $1 million) or an option to
buy such stock. Deferred compensation is essentially debt. Rather
than paying cash today, the employer promises to pay the employee
SERVICES: INDUSTRY PROGRESS & THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 2 (2009). See also
FIN. STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES 4
(2009) [hereinafter FSF PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf (“Multiple surveys find that over 80 percent of
market participants believe that compensation practices played a role in promoting
the accumulation of risks that led to the current crisis.”).
2. See FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 7–8; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM—A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 29 (2010), http://www.treasury.gov
/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (“Among the many significant causes
of the financial crisis were compensation practices. In particular, incentives for
short-term gains overwhelmed the checks and balances meant to mitigate against
the risk of excess leverage. We will seek to better align compensation practices
with the interests of shareholders and the stability of firms and the financial system
. . . .”).
3. See generally Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring
Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205 (2011);
Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why
Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1173 (2010); Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Economics,
Politics, and the International Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: An
Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431 (2011); Karl
S. Okamoto & Douglas Edwards, Risk-Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159 (2010);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of
Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming
Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J.
ON REG. 359 (2009).
4. See FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. See also generally FIN. STABILITY BD.,
CHARTER OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD (2012), available at http:
//www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf.
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some presumably greater amount in the future. Across all industries,
U.S. firms regularly pay equity or deferred compensation without
overt compulsion.5
Until recently, nothing required firms to avoid cash
compensation, but regulators are currently dropping their laissezfaire approach to financial-sector pay. U.S. and E.U. regulators are
set to require banks to defer significant portions of banker bonuses.
Prominent academics concur, arguing that bankers should receive
much of their pay in the form of corporate bonds or debentures
rather than cash or corporate stock. These regulations and proposals6
would require banks to pay what I call “debt-based compensation.”
Mandating debt-based compensation has a seemingly
straightforward justification. Cash bonuses based on annual
performance encourage risk. A banker who generates big profits
enjoys a big bonus. A banker who generates big losses does not
personally suffer a big loss. The asymmetry between the high
rewards for success and the low punishment of failure encourages
excessive risk-taking. Because shareholders enjoy limited liability
but potentially unlimited growth, equity compensation only
exacerbates the problem. Debt-based compensation, according to
reformers, encourages caution. If a boom-year bonus is deferred,
then the banker faces a risk of nonpayment if the employer becomes
insolvent. Even without insolvency, employers may have the power
to reduce previously deferred bonuses if long-term performance
disappoints. Financial products sold through 2006 generated huge
bonuses based on successful short-term performance. By 2008,
however, the long-term performance of bankers proved to be
disastrous. Had those 2006 bonuses been deferred, the bankers
might have been forced to forfeit them in 2008.
The history of regulating compensation, however, is littered with
simple justifications and unintended consequences. The standard
concern has been minimizing “agency costs” which arise when
managers pursue agendas at odds with their shareholders. Public
disclosures of compensation were supposed to allow shareholders to
check excesses but may have led to a perverse competition in which
firms actually pay more in an attempt to signal their managerial
5. Firms may have tax or regulatory incentives for doing so. For example,
U.S. law limits the tax deductions for the expense of certain executive salaries, but
these limits do not apply to properly structured equity or deferred compensation.
See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6. See FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION
PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS (2009) [hereinafter FSB
IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS], available at http://www.financialstabilityboard
.org/publications/r_090925c.pdf; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3; Tung, supra
note 3.
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superiority. In 1993, Congress tinkered with the tax code to
encourage public companies to pay their executives with stock
options rather than salary. These executive stock options were
supposed to give executives “pay for performance”—managers win
when shareholders win. But stock options may have simply given
managers a more powerful way to extract value from shareholders.
The stakes in regulating banker pay go far beyond agency costs.
Failures and distress in the financial sector threaten not only a
narrow class of shareholders but the financial and economic stability
of the world. While no one expects banker-pay regulation to restore
the U.S. to 5% unemployment or a AAA credit rating, reformers
hope that their proposals will encourage future bankers to be more
prudent. Yet, just as the stakes are now higher, so are the risks of
unintended consequences.
It is true that debt-based pay exposes bankers to additional loss
if their employers fail. Yet, the added risk of loss may be too remote
to change behaviors, especially when governments routinely bail out
financial firms. More seriously, debt-based compensation may lead
to even more risk and financial instability. Debt typically offers a
low rate of return. In order to counter the conservative nature of
debt-based compensation, bankers might actually take on even
greater risks.7 Additionally, punishing bankers for failure may
complicate the government’s response to crisis. Debt-based
compensation would be completely wiped out at any firm that is
thrown into the new Dodd–Frank system for resolving troubled
financial firms. Debt-based compensation thus increases the
incentives of bankers to seek bailouts rather than to cooperate with
regulators in resolving troubled firms.8
This Article analyzes banker-pay regulation in the context of
overall financial regulation. According to Part II, the primary goal of
financial regulation is to reduce systemic risk, defined here as the
extraordinary and external costs of distress at banks and financial
firms. In 2008, widespread insolvency and distress in the financial
sector threatened the entire global economy, not just financial firms
and their stakeholders. In other words, regulators are justified in
forcing financial firms to reduce risk-taking because systemic risk is
an externality.
Part III reviews the legislative and regulatory details of the new
movement to regulate banker pay. Pay regulation seeks to
accomplish various goals in various ways. For example, regulators
seem concerned not only with systemic risk but also shareholder
losses. Also, much of the regulatory approach is based on principles
7. See infra Part V.C.
8. See infra Part V.B.
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and best practices. For example, regulated firms would need to
establish good procedures to coordinate compensation practices with
risk management. The most interesting element of the pay
regulation, however, would require firms to defer banker pay.
Part IV considers how banker pay might control systemic risk.
Governments not only regulate banks but also support them with
bailouts in times of crisis. Because of this support, banks can pursue
additional risk without fear of failure. This is the classic “moral
hazard” criticism of bailouts. Reformers argue that debt-based
compensation reinserts fear of failure in the minds of bankers.
Yet, as Part V shows, debt-based compensation cannot impose a
fear of loss if governments continue to bail out troubled firms. Even
if governments could somehow impose losses on bankers while
supporting troubled banks, the threat of these losses is a very weak
incentive when compared to the incentive to earn greater bonuses by
taking on greater risk. And, as discussed previously, the incentives
may actually work against financial stability by complicating
government activities during a time of crisis. For these reasons, Part
VI concludes with the recommendation that regulators not focus on
compensation when regulating financial firms.
II. SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE GOAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
The new movement to regulate banker pay may simply be the
instinctive response of policymakers to the financial crisis. The
movement not only allows policymakers to “do something,” but it
targets the extravagantly paid bankers thought to be responsible.
Several commentators, however, have justified pay regulation as
accomplishing the general goal of bank regulation: allowing banks
to perform their valuable services while minimizing the risks to the
rest of the economy.9 Thus, we need some understanding of the
social costs of banking before we can evaluate the need to regulate
banker pay. This Part will try to compress the basic concepts in a
few paragraphs.
A. Financial Intermediation
Your bank my call you a “customer” (or, if you are rich enough,
a “client”), but you and your deposits are really a source of
financing for the bank’s investments. The classic use of bank funds
is to make loans to homebuyers and businesses. Readers might
remember George Bailey standing down his panicked and
homespun depositors in It’s a Wonderful Life: “You’re thinking of
9. See supra note 3.
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this place all wrong. As if I had the money back in a safe. The
money’s not here. Your money’s in Joe’s house; that’s right next to
yours. And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin’s house, and a
hundred others.”10
Of course, businesses and individuals throughout the economy
borrow to finance their investments. What makes banks unique,
however, is that they typically lend long-term, illiquid investments
but finance with short-term, liquid liabilities.11 The bank may invest
in Mrs. Macklin’s and Joe’s mortgages, but the bank cannot demand
immediate repayment, nor can it easily sell those mortgages in a
market. In contrast, the bank receives its funds from depositors who
may demand repayment on a moment’s notice. The assets (mortgage
claims against borrowers) and liabilities (deposits held for
depositors) are mismatched.
The important service that Bailey and other banks provide is
financial intermediation.12 Mrs. Macklin wants a 30-year mortgage.
Her neighbors want a safe but accessible place to put their money.
Bailey takes in short-term deposits and channels the funds to longterm borrowers. Doing so lets the depositors diversify across lots of
mortgages and business loans (not just Mrs. Macklin’s). Bailey’s
problem was that his depositors all showed up at once demanding to
be paid.13
Modern banks still lend Mrs. Macklin money. But rather than
holding her mortgage indefinitely, they likely “originate to
distribute.”14 A bank pools thousands of mortgages into a single
portfolio, which is then sliced (tranched) into marketable securities
for resale to investors. Different tranches have different priorities of
repayment, with the senior tranche being repaid first, the equity
tranche last, and the mezzanine tranche in between.15 The allure of
tranching comes from the ability to place a high (e.g., AAA) credit
rating on the senior tranche, making it marketable to conservative
and regulated investors. Mezzanine tranches carry a lower, less
marketable credit rating (e.g., BBB), while equity tranches are not
10. IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946), available at http://www
.script-o-rama.com/movie_scripts/i/its-a-wonderful-life-script.html (script).
11. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 37 (4th ed. 2009).
12. See Daniel A. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, 73 VA. L. REV. 301, 306–07 (1987).
13. Parts II.B and II.C describe how bank runs can destabilize the economy
and how governments try to control them.
14. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 447 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf
/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
15. See id. at 43.
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rated at all. Creating “high quality” tranches is so alluring that banks
reiterated the process, pooling the mezzanine tranches themselves
into a new portfolio, which is itself then tranched into collaterized
debt obligations (CDOs) of senior, mezzanine, and equity
tranches.16
Despite this process of securitization, much of the risks
remained within the banking system, as banks were some of the
largest buyers of CDOs and similar products.17 When real estate
prices fell and borrowers began to default, banks could not divest
these risks because no one else wanted to buy CDOs. Even senior
tranches looked like toxic waste, not conservative investments.
Banks discovered at that time that they had not successfully
converted Mrs. Macklin’s long-term, illiquid mortgage into a liquid
security.
Much as modern banking has shifted from Mrs. Macklin’s
mortgage to CDOs, it has also turned to new sources of financing.
Modern banks still finance with traditional deposits, but they also
raise funds through so-called shadow banking. For example,
repurchase agreements or repo allow banks to raise funds cheaply
and quickly without the bother of obtaining a bank loan, issuing
securities, or taking in deposits.18 Repo is secured lending: the
lender buys an asset from the borrower on the condition that the
borrower buy it back at a slightly higher price in the future. The
term is very short, and the buyback date is often the very next day.19
Repo lenders might be other financial institutions and, indirectly,
retail investors. Money-market funds take in contributions from a
wide array of investors (including individuals of modest means) and
invest them in short-term, liquid debt instruments like repo. Moneymarket funds and deposits are regulated differently but function
similarly, both giving short-term investors an accessible place to
park their money while giving borrowers a source of financing.
Banks and other financial firms came to rely heavily on repo
borrowing to finance their investments in the years leading up to the
crisis. Because they are not insured by the FDIC, however, repo
lenders have far more incentive to react to bank distress than
depositors. Ordinarily, banks can rely on repo lenders to roll over
their expiring loans or find new ones on the market. During times of
distress, however, repo lenders can walk away with their money at
16. See id. at 71–72.
17. See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, & OTHER DERIVATIVES 189 (8th
ed. 2011).
18. Commercial paper is another form of short-term borrowing included in
the shadow-banking system. See generally id. at 29–34.
19. Id. at 76.
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any time, which has the same effect as withdrawing a bank deposit.
One prominent account of the financial crisis calls it a “run on
repo,”20 in which losses in the subprime market caused repo lenders
to demand greater or higher quality collateral or simply to exit the
market altogether. Just as in a bank run, the bank does not have
enough liquidity on hand to pay the borrowers.21 At the height of the
financial crisis, the Treasury Department took the extraordinary step
of guaranteeing money-market funds, much like the FDIC
guarantees deposits.22
B. The Fire-Sale Externality and Systemic Risk
The prevailing view is that excessive risk taking at financial
institutions substantially contributed to the recent crisis.23 We need,
however, some idea of what makes some risk-taking “excessive”
and why self-serving firms would subject themselves to it.24 Poorly
run businesses fail all the time, and this “creative destruction” is a
central part of free-market economies.25 Moreover, a bank run
causes illiquidity not insolvency. The fact that George Bailey’s
depositors all want their money does not directly make Mrs.
Macklin’s loan worth less. Similarly, the fact that repo lenders
withdraw from the market en masse does not make illiquid CDOs26
worth less.
20. See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo 1 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752.
21. The lenders may themselves be retail investors who have bought shares of
money-market mutual funds. The funds act as conduits, taking in “deposits” from
investors and using them to buy repo or other short-term assets from borrowers.
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 30.
22. See Press Release, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program
for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx.
23. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 14, at xix (“We
conclude a combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis.”).
24. Cf. Kevin J. Murphy, Compensation Structure and Systemic Risk 1 (Univ.
of S. Cal., Marshall Sch. of Bus., Marshall Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. FBE 34-09, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract _id=1461944 (“Political pressures to reform pay have escalated in
spite of limited evidence that compensation structures have, in fact, been
responsible for excessive risk taking in the financial services industry. Indeed, the
pressures have emerged even without a definition of ‘excessive risk taking’ or how
we might distinguish excessive risk from the normal risks . . . .”).
25. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
83 (1942) (“This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about
capitalism.”).
26. Cf. supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing CDOs).
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To meet the repayment obligations when facing a run, however,
the bank needs cash. If the bank does not have enough and cannot
raise more through new deposits, repo, or the like, it will need to sell
its stake in Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage or the CDOs. During a panic,
however, several banks are looking to sell and few are looking to
buy. Banks thus need to accept a lower value for the asset. But
doing so forces the bank to revalue all similar assets it holds, even if
it is not selling. The distressed sale affects the bank’s entire balance
sheet.27
Suppose that a bank has assets valued at $100 billion, derived
from repo lending of $90 billion and equity of $10 billion. All of the
assets are invested in CDOs. Now, suppose that 10% of the bank’s
repo lenders (holding $9 billion of claims) fear losses on the bank’s
investments in CDOs and refuse to roll over their repo. No one else
is willing to supply new funds. The bank needs $9 billion of cash to
repay these lenders. This is no problem if it can simply sell CDOs at
book value.28 But, recall that the market is concerned about the
bank, so the bank might need to accept a lower price. Perhaps the
bank needs to sell 10% of its portfolio—previously thought to have
been worth $10 billion but sellable for only $9 billion. Initially, this
discount might not look so bad if the bank is merely taking a $1
billion loss, which can be absorbed by its $10 billion of equity. After
the sale, it has CDOs of $90 billion and cash of $9 billion, right?
Perhaps not, because the discount sale may affect the entire
balance sheet. The bank is selling some of its CDOs at a 10%
discount, suggesting a need to discount all of its holdings that much.
Arguably, it now has CDOs discounted to $81 billion and cash
worth of $9 billion. Because it still has liabilities of $90 billion, its
entire equity is wiped out, putting it on the edge of insolvency.
News of the bank’s distress panics its remaining lenders, who
decline to roll over their repo. The second wave crushes the bank if
it needs to accept further discounts on its CDOs. This vicious cycle
is the “run on repo” mentioned above.29

27. The analysis that follows relies heavily on Markus K. Brunnermeier,
Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP., no.
1, 2009, at 77. The Article enjoyed fame of which few academics dream when
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke recommended it (along with two other
articles and one book) for those trying to understand the financial crisis. See
Michael Corkery, Ben Bernanke’s Labor Day Reading List, WSJ DEAL JOURNAL
(Sept. 2, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/09/02/ben-bernankeslabor-day-reading-list/.
28. The bank’s balance sheet would have $91 billion of assets, $81 billion of
deposits–repo, and $10 billion of equity.
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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The cycle likewise endangers other banks, which may be
holding similar CDOs financed by similarly panicked depositors and
repo lenders. Because the discount selling affects other banks, it has
been termed the fire-sale externality.30 We usually expect lower
prices to attract bargain hunters, driving up demand and stabilizing
prices. But depositors, repo lenders, and other banks are all looking
to get out of the market. Without buyers, a “liquidity spiral” takes
hold, making banking structures less stable and self-correcting than
most economic activities.31
The liquidity spiral does not directly affect bank borrowers like
Mrs. Macklin. She is unlikely to know or care if her mortgage has
been sliced up and sold several times over. Yet, her 25-year-old
daughter, Miranda, might not be able to find a loan for her new
house. Or, her law-firm employer might need to lay her off as tighter
credit conditions drive down economic activity and the demand for
legal services. Instability, distress, and failure in banking can spread,
inflicting costs upon society at large, not just the shareholders,
depositors, and other stakeholders of a firm.32 This characteristic,
known as systemic risk,33 explains how perhaps $1 trillion of
subprime mortgage losses translated into an $8 trillion decline in the
U.S. stock market and the worst economic crisis since the Great
Depression.
In light of these costs, this Article will treat systemic risk as an
externality that justifies regulation. Professor Jeffrey Gordon argues
that systemic risk arises not from an externality but from a
collective-action problem of shareholders. 34 Gordon acknowledges
30. See Brunnermeier, supra note 27, passim.
31. See id.
32. See Steven L. Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008)
(describing systemic risk as an externality).
33. Steven Schwarz defines systemic risk as
[T]he risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a
chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financialmarket price volatility.
Steven L. Schwarz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). Similarly, Hal
Scott contends the following:
Systemic risk has two distinct meanings. First, it refers to a financial
shock that has simultaneous impact on a number of financial institutions.
Second, it refers to the chain reaction problem, the possibility that the
failure of one bank will affect other banks. To some extent, these two
versions are interrelated: a major shock can trigger a chain reaction.
HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 173 (16th ed. 2009).
34. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate
Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for Convertible Equity-Based Pay
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that insiders (directors, managers, and large-block shareholders) do
not fully internalize the costs of systemic risk, which run throughout
the entire economy rather than just the particular firm. Consider
Goldman Sachs as an example and assume (for the sake of
argument) that it continues to expose the economy to systemic risk
in mid-2011. In Gordon’s view, the costs of systemic risk generated
by Goldman Sachs are reflected in every component of a diversified
portfolio other than Goldman Sachs securities. Lloyd Blankfein
(Goldman’s CEO) has insufficient exposure to these non-Goldman
investments to reduce systemic risk. Its large-block shareholders,
like Berkshire Hathaway, are concentrated in Goldman and face
diminished incentives as well.35 In contrast, a diversified shareholder
(like a mutual fund) does bear the full costs of systemic risk in
Gordon’s view but lacks the power and organization to change the
systemic-risk taker’s management or policies. The shareholder
cannot vote with its feet by selling shares because systemic risk
plagues not the risk taker but the portfolio as a whole.
Gordon’s argument turns, implicitly, on classifying diversified
shareholders as the relevant economic actors. Diversified
shareholders care about their overall portfolio, but directors (along
with executives and large-block shareholders) care about the
particular firm’s performance. Viewing directors and other insiders
as the relevant actors probably reflects the economic and legal
realities of publicly traded companies36 and leads to the conclusion
that systemic risk is a classic externality.37 Economic actors
(directors, etc., rather than diversified shareholders) impose costs on
society because they do not bear the full costs of their actions
(systemic risk).

(Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 373, 2010), available at http:
//ssrn.com/abstract =1633906.
35. Cf. THE GOLDMAN SACHS GRP., PROXY STATEMENT FOR 2011 ANNUAL
MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 56–58 (2011), available at http://www.goldman
sachs.com/investor-relations/financials/archived/proxy-statements/docs/2011proxy-statement.pdf (detailing beneficial ownership of executives and large
shareholders).
36. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends
of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
37. Cf., e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352
(1995) (“An externality is present whenever the well-being of a consumer or the
production possibilities of a firm are directly affected by the actions of another
agent in the economy.”); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C.
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 307 (1998) (“An externality exists
whenever a person does not enjoy all the benefits or incur all the costs that result
from the actions that person undertakes.”).
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Even if diversified shareholders were the relevant actors, they do
not bear all the costs of systemic risk, such as losses to human
capital. From July 2007 to July 2011, the unemployment rate has
nearly doubled, going from 4.7% to 9.1%.38 The human capital of
those graduating from college and law school has been seriously
impaired during the same time with the scarcity of entry-level
professional jobs. While the stock market has fallen over the same
period,39 financial markets do not reflect the impact on current and
future career opportunities40 and only imperfectly the effects on less
liquid markets, such as housing.
C. Regulation and Support of Systemically Important Institutions
The prior Section suggests that systemic risk is a type of
externality for firms. Firms certainly suffer from financial distress,
but banking is unique in that distress not only spreads but amplifies
through the rest of the economy. Thus, it is possible that banks
would take risks that are privately optimal (even if they turn out
badly for the banks) but socially destructive. To control these risks,
governments not only regulate banks but also support them in times
of distress.
1. Bank Activities
Governments have long regulated the types of activities that
banks can undertake. The Depression-era Glass–Steagall Act41
divorced commercial banking (i.e., taking customer deposits) from
investment banking (i.e., acting as broker, dealer, or underwriter for
securities) but had been repealed by the end of the 20th century.42
38. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Labor Force
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries
/LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
39. The S&P 500 Index has fallen by about 11% over this four-year period,
going from 1519.43 on July 2, 2007 to 1339.67 on July 1, 2011. See ^GSPC
Historical Prices, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGSPC
+Historical +Prices (last visited Mar. 25, 2013).
40. But cf. Gordon, supra note 34, at 4. (“Even though shareholders may not
internalize all of the costs of systemic distress (because there are losses beyond
portfolio losses, for example the human costs of higher unemployment and costs
that ramify internationally), their internalized losses are sufficient to justify
appropriate measures to control financial firm risk-taking.”).
41. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
42. The Glass–Steagall provisions were sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the
Banking Act of 1933. See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation
and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass–Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1
n.1 (1984). Sections 16 and 21 remain in force, preventing the same corporate
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Glass–Steagall had several rationales, one of which was to protect
the banking system from the risks inherent the stock market.43
The Dodd–Frank Act attempts a similar divide between
regulated banks and securities dealing with its “Volcker rule,”44
prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading on their own
account (rather than for clients).45 The Volcker rule is a high-profile
slice of Dodd–Frank, which dramatically expands the authority of
financial regulators, especially over the large bank holding
companies that now dominate American finance.46 Like Glass–
Steagall, the Volcker rule regulates the asset side of the bank’s
balance sheet. Because volatile assets are more likely to send a bank
into insolvency than placid ones, governments try to direct banks
into less investment.
2. Capital Adequacy
Firm assets, regulated as discussed above, determine the amount
of losses a firm might face. Firm capital structure, however,
determines the amount of losses a firm can absorb before becoming
distressed or insolvent.47 A firm funded 100% with common equity
could not become insolvent; whereas, a firm funded 100% with debt

entity from acting as both investment and commercial bank. See 12 U.S.C. § 24
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (codifying section 16, as amended); 12 U.S.C. § 378
(2006) (codifying section 21, as amended). Sections 20 and 32 prevented
investment and commercial banks from coming under common control (either by
corporate structure or by interlocking directors, officers, or employees). These
provisions were formally repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat 1338, 1341 (1999), although prior regulatory and
judicial interpretations had largely eviscerated them. See Jonathan R. Macey, The
Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm–Leach–Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691,
691–92 (2000).
43. See Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630–31 (1971).
44. The Volcker rule is named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul
Volcker who advocated for the rule. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL,
STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING &
CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 1–2
(2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%
20sec%20% 20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
45. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, § 619(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010); see also id. § 619(h)(4),
124 Stat. at 1630 (defining proprietary trading). The prohibition applies to a
“banking entity,” which includes a depository institution, its parent company, and
affiliates. See id. § 619(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 1629.
46. See, e.g., id. § 114(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 1403 (authorizing additional
regulation for “large, interconnected bank holding companies”).
47. Cf. infra Part VI.B.1 (contrasting the investing and financing decisions).
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becomes insolvent with the slightest loss. As financial intermediaries,
banks naturally hold debt in their capital structure in the form of
demand deposits.
To reduce the risk of distress or insolvency, regulators require
banks to hold a certain level of common equity and other “capital” on
their balance sheets. The actual rules for bank capital are incredibly
complex48 but present fairly straightforward issues. Regulators must
define what qualifies as capital and specify the amount a bank must
carry. Common equity clearly qualifies, and senior secured debt does
not. Firms also finance with instruments having characteristics of both
debt and equity, like preferred stock and unsecured debentures. This
Article discusses hybrid instruments that issue as debt but convert to
equity if the firm becomes financially distressed.49
3. Deposit Insurance
Federal deposit insurance not only protects depositors but also
removes their incentive to panic and make a run on their banks.
Before the financial crisis, the FDIC protected account values up to
$100,000.50 To calm depositors and prevent bank runs, the
government increased this protection to $250,000.51 The Treasury
department even temporarily guaranteed money market mutual
funds,52 the supposedly uninsured mutual funds that invest in repo
and other short-term corporate obligations.53 As discussed below,
however, deposit insurance is a key contributor to moral hazard at
banks. Depositors have little or no incentive to monitor the financial
stability of their banks, leaving banks free (or at least freer) to
pursue overly risky projects.54
48. See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. See also BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK
COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128
.pdf.
49. See infra notes 220–26 and accompanying text.
50. Cf. Dodd–Frank Act § 335(a), 124 Stat. at 1540 (replacing $100,000 limit
with $250,000).
51. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (Supp. V 2011). The FDIC fully insures
noninterest-bearing accounts through December 31, 2012. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(a)(1)(B)(ii); Dodd–Frank Act § 343(a), 124 Stat. at 1544–45.
52. See Press Release, Frequently Asked Questions About Treasury’s
Temporary Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1163
.aspx.
53. Cf. supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the “run on repo”).
54. See infra Part VI.C.
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4. Discount Window and Other Lending Facilities
Banks face the risk of illiquidity because they borrow short-term
funds (e.g., deposits, repo) and invest in long-term projects (e.g.,
Mrs. Macklin’s mortgage, structured finance projects). Thus, a
perfectly solvent bank may not have enough liquid funds to
discharge its liabilities. Through its discount window, the Federal
Reserve System (the Fed) acts as lender-of-last-resort and makes
short-term loans to banks facing liquidity strains.55
During the crisis, many banks feared they would be stigmatized
by borrowing from the discount window, perversely making the
discount window a destabilizing force.56 In December 2007, the Fed
responded to this concern by creating the Term Auction Facility
(TAF), which came to dwarf the discount window during the
crisis.57 Because TAF used a competitive bidding process, banks
perceived it as carrying less stigma than the discount window.58
TAF was open only to depository institutions.59 To supply
liquidity to other financial institutions, the Fed created a wide array
of extraordinary lending facilities and guarantee programs.60 In
December 2010, the Fed revealed the details of many of these
55. See THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 45–46
(9th ed. 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete
.pdf.
56. Before Dodd–Frank, the Federal Reserve did not publish the identity of
discount-window borrowers, although it did publish the volume of borrowing.
Nevertheless, banks feared that others could detect their discount-window
borrowing by analyzing private borrowing patterns and the published volume of
borrowing. See Renee Courtois Haltom, Stigma and the Discount Window,
REGION FOCUS, First Quarter 2011, at 6, 6, available at http://www.richmondfed
.org/publications/research/region_focus/2011/q1/pdf/federal_reserve.pdf.
57. See id. at 8.
58. Indeed, banks paid higher rates using TAF than they could at the discount
window. See id.; see also Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger & James
McAndrews, The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility, 14 FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., no. 5, 2008, at 1, 6, available at http://www
.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci14-5.pdf (describing the decreased
stigma from auction borrowing).
59. See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,202,
71,202 (Dec. 17, 2007) (“The final rule provides that advances under a TAF will
be made only to depository institutions that are in generally sound financial
condition, are expected to remain in that condition during the term of the advance
and are eligible to receive advances under section 10B of the Federal Reserve
Act.”).
60. The legal authorization for these facilities comes from section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act. See BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL TURMOIL 16 (2010), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41073.pdf. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006 & Supp.
V 2011) (codifying section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act).

2013]

DEFERRING BANKER PAY

939

transactions, identifying participants ranging from Goldman Sachs
to Harley–Davidson.61
5. Bank Creditor Bailouts
Afraid that default would further destabilize the financial
system, the U.S. government deployed massive funds to keep bank
creditors whole while letting shareholders suffer to curtail moral
hazard. When the New York Fed brokered a deal for JPMorgan to
buy Bear Stearns, it actually insisted on a lower price than
JPMorgan was willing to pay.62 And, when it put Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac in government conservatorship, it largely squeezed out
the interests of their shareholders (including Ralph Nader, who has
taken his grievances to the readership of the The Wall Street
Journal).63
Early on, the government’s assistance was ad hoc, as with the
Bear Stearns deal. As the financial crisis intensified, it became clear
that many firms would fold without direct assistance. The
government started an array of ambitious programs to prop up
failing banks, the most famous of which is the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP), created by Congress in October 2008.64 The
Treasury Department used its TARP funding and authority to buy
roughly $200 billion of preferred stock in banks and other
companies, most of which has now been repaid.65
Even though bailouts largely protected bank creditors, not all
remained intact. In another government-brokered acquisition,
JPMorgan bought the assets of failed thrift Washington Mutual
subject to the claims of its depositors and general creditors. It did
not, however, assume any obligations to Washington Mutual’s
equity and subordinated debt holders, who were wiped out in the
deal.66 Similarly, creditors of Lehman Brothers were left to fend for

61. See David Reilly & Rolfe Winkler, Moral Hazard, Thy Price Is $3.3
Trillion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748704594804575649070454645244.html.
62. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
DODD–FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 146 (2011).
63. See Ralph Nader, The Great Fannie and Freddie Rip-Off, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 26, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703555804576
102423 446952218.html.
64. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, tit.
I, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767–3800.
65. See WEBEL & LABONTE, supra note 60.
66. See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in
Bankruptcy, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1034 (2010).
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themselves in bankruptcy.67 Nevertheless, most creditors of failed
banks survived unimpaired thanks to government bailouts. As
Professor David Skeel notes, “The bailouts of 2008 were creditor
bailouts.”68
III. POST-TARP MOVEMENT TO REGULATE BANKER PAY
A. Introduction
After the financial crisis, outrage over bailouts and bonuses
made some form of banker-pay regulation inevitable. What made
pay regulation seem natural, however, was the long history of
federal regulation.69 Before the financial crisis, however, these
attempts were largely indirect and implemented through the tax and
securities laws. The Internal Revenue Code favored some
arrangements (e.g., stock options) while disfavoring others (e.g.,
large fixed salaries) under the theory that the favored arrangements
would encourage higher levels of executive performance. Using its
regulatory power, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
required disclosure of executive pay packages. The SEC remained
facially neutral about different types of arrangements but was clearly
motivated by the idea that public disclosure would curtail executive
pay.70
Financial firms were singled out during the crisis and ensuing
bailouts. TARP limited the amount of compensation that TARP
recipients could pay and subjected their pay practices to regulatory
oversight by a new “pay czar,” Kenneth Feinberg.71 The TARP
limits ceased to apply once firms repaid their assistance, which most
recipient firms have now done.72 Because of the outrage over the

67. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial
Crisis: Dodd–Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance
Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 200–01 (2011).
68. See SKEEL, supra note 62, at 147.
69. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior
Federal Attempts to Curb Perceived Abuses, 10 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 196, 198
(2010).
70. Id. at 235–41.
71. See Michael S. Melbinger, Executive Compensation & Risk: TARP Rules
for Financial Institutions Trigger Broader Risk Assessment of Compensation
Policies, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 59 (2010); John W. Lee, Tax TARP Needed for
Year One and Year Two Returns of Executive Bonus to TARP Recipient: A Case
Study of Year One Rescission/Exclusion From Income and Year Two Deduction
Under Section 1341, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 323 (2010).
72. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: TWO YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (2010), available at
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crisis and the extravagance of financial-sector compensation, it was
inevitable that policymakers would seek more permanent regulation
of banker pay.
B. Dodd–Frank’s Unfocused Compensation Reforms
Just as the collapse of Enron gave birth to Sarbanes–Oxley, the
financial crisis spawned its own signature legislation, Dodd–
Frank.73 The Act is enormous in scope and size, running nearly 850
pages in the Statutes at Large74 and reforming financial regulation
of gargantuan bank holding companies75 down to pawnshops and
payday lenders.76
1. Compensation Reforms of General Application
Given the widely held view (even inside the industry) that
compensation practices played some role in the crisis, one would
have expected Congress to devote considerable attention to
compensation in drafting the Act. Dodd–Frank, however, devotes a
mere eight pages to compensation practices.77 Most of them apply to
all public companies, not just those in the financial sector. The
following Dodd–Frank reforms have such universal application:
• Periodic but nonbinding shareholder advisory votes on
executive compensation (i.e., say on pay),78
• Independence of compensation committees,79
• Disclosures relating executive pay versus performance,80
• Recovery of erroneously awarded executive compensation
following a restatement of earnings (i.e., clawbacks),81 and

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/news/Documents/TARP%20Two%20Year
%20Retrospective_10%2005%2010_transmittal%20letter.pdf.
73. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The boom-bust-legislation pattern predates
Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 77 (2003).
74. Dodd–Frank Act §§ 1–1601, 124 Stat. at 1376–2223.
75. See, e.g., id. §§ 161–176, 124 Stat. at 1420–42.
76. See SKEEL, supra note 62, at 107.
77. Dodd–Frank spans from 124 Stat. at 1376 to 124 Stat. at 2223.
78. Dodd–Frank Act § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899–1900.
79. Id. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900–03.
80. Id. § 953, 124 Stat. at 1903–04.
81. Id. § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904. Cf. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 304(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (imposing clawbacks on CEOs and CFOs).
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•

Disclosure of company policies on whether executives can
hedge against declines in equity compensation (stock or
options).82
Though some claim ulterior motives,83 the public-spirited
justification is that federal regulation is necessary to align the
divergent interests of management and shareholders.84 A Senate
committee report justified the provisions as enhancing shareholder
value.85 Regarding clawbacks, the report said, “The Committee
believes it is unfair to shareholders for corporations to allow
executives to retain compensation that they were awarded
erroneously.”86 Similarly, according to the committee, disclosures
about hedging policies “will allow shareholders to know if executives
are allowed to purchase financial instruments to effectively avoid
compensation restrictions that they hold stock long-term, so that they
will receive their compensation even in the case that their firm does
not perform.”87
In the financial sector, however, enhancing shareholder value
does not necessarily enhance societal welfare. As discussed below,
shareholders may have the incentive to pursue excessive risks
because they do not bear the costs of systemic risk.88 Moreover, the
government socializes much of the risk of banking by providing a
safety net of deposit insurance, emergency lending, and bailouts.89
2. FDIC Clawback Authority
Dodd–Frank gives regulators a powerful new tool to put large,
failing financial firms into receivership.90 This new resolution
82. Dodd–Frank Act § 955, 124 Stat. at 1904–05.
83. Critics of compensation reform often claim that reformers have motives
other than shareholder value. Indeed, some reformers openly pursue other goals.
Professor Stephen Bainbridge, an early and critical commentator on the Dodd–
Frank compensation provisions, contends that “Dodd–Frank’s corporate
governance provisions were included in the legislation because key policy
entrepreneurs were able to hijack the legislative process to advance a longstanding political agenda.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd–Frank: Quack Federal
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1816 (2011). Round I
was Sarbanes–Oxley. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
84. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE (2004).
85. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 133–36 (2010).
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id.
88. See supra Part II.B.
89. See supra Part II.C.3–5.
90. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, §§ 201–217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520.
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authority was enacted primarily to avoid a future Lehman
Brothers—an enormous financial firm going through bankruptcy
proceedings considered by many ill-equipped to deal with such size
and complexity.91 Congress clearly views the new resolution
authority as supplanting bankruptcy and perhaps future bailouts as
well.92 Many, though, question whether the Federal Reserve and
Treasury Department will swear off bailouts should they consider
them appropriate in the future.93
As for the mechanics of the new authority, the Treasury, Federal
Reserve, and FDIC must jointly decide to place a systemically
important financial firm into resolution, based primarily on the
determination that the firm is in default or in danger of default.94
The FDIC conducts the resolution process and has broad powers in
deciding which creditors should be paid and in what amounts.95
Equity compensation should be automatically wiped out during
resolution.96 Previously earned but unpaid bonuses—i.e., deferred
compensation—would surely be scrutinized and likely repudiated by
the FDIC.97
Indeed, the resolution authority targets compensation paid
before the start of resolution. Dodd–Frank authorizes the FDIC to
recover all payments made to senior executives two years prior to
the start of the resolution process.98 Both the statute and proposed
regulations allow the “clawback” only when the senior executive is
“substantially responsible” for the firm’s failure.99 CEOs and CFOs
are presumed substantially responsible but may rebut the
91. But cf. SKEEL, supra note 62, at 31 (“Given the tumultuous environment in
which Lehman filed its original bankruptcy petition, the assumption that
bankruptcy must have been a disaster is perhaps understandable. But in fact,
bankruptcy worked quite well.”).
92. Cf. Dodd–Frank Act § 1, 124 Stat. at 1376 (describing the purposes of the
Act as “improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end
‘too big to fail’, [and] to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts”).
93. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–10 (Jan. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Quarterly%20Reports/January2011_Quarterly
_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
94. See Dodd–Frank Act § 203(b), 124 Stat. at 1451; SKEEL, supra note 62, at
121.
95. See SKEEL, supra note 62, at 148.
96. See Dodd–Frank Act § 204(a), 124 Stat. at 1454–55; id. § 210, at 1514.
97. The FDIC has proposed giving such obligations a lower priority than
subordinated debt. See 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,340 (Mar. 23, 2011).
98. Dodd–Frank Act § 210(s), 124 Stat. at 1514. Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 380.1 (2013)
(defining senior executive).
99. See Dodd–Frank Act § 210(s)(1), 124 Stat. at 1514; Orderly Liquidation
Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,324, 16,338 (proposed Mar. 23, 2011).
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presumption by showing they “performed [their] duties with the
requisite degree of skill and care required.”100
3. Compensation at Covered Financial Institutions
Even before the financial crisis, U.S. bank regulators prohibited
“excessive compensation” as an “unsafe and unsound practice.”101
In contrast to the usual concern over excessive compensation, the
goal of these regulations is to protect depositors and the banking
system, not bank shareholders. Indeed, from a regulatory
perspective, excessive compensation is no more or less harmful than
excessive dividends, as both deplete bank capital.102 In June 2010
(just before Dodd–Frank passed), federal banking regulators
finalized rules on compensation at banks and their holding
companies,103 reflecting international agreements discussed in the
next Section.
Congress gave its express approval to banker-pay regulation in
Dodd–Frank Act section 956. The Act covers compensation
structures at “covered financial institutions,” a term that includes
important banks, among others.104 Federal financial regulators have
the authority to promulgate rules that prohibit any types of
incentive-based payment arrangement, or any feature of any such
arrangement, that the regulators determine encourages inappropriate
risks by covered financial institutions (1) by providing an executive
officer, employee, director, or principal shareholder of the covered
financial institution with excessive compensation, fees, or benefits;
or (2) that could lead to material financial loss to the covered
financial institution.105
Section 956 suggests that compensation can harm financial
institutions in ways other than depleting capital. It can “encourage[]
100. 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,338.
101. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 app. A (“Excessive compensation is prohibited as an
unsafe and unsound practice.”); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208 app. D-1 (same); 12 C.F.R. pt.
364 app. A (same); 12 C.F.R. pt. 570 app. A (same).
102. Cf. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK:
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS AND DIVIDENDS (SECTION 303) 8 (1991), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook
/capital1.pdf (“Excessive dividends can weaken a bank’s capital position.”).
103. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg.
36,395 (June 25, 2010).
104. Dodd–Frank Act § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905–06. Covered financial
institutions include depository institutions and their holding companies, broker
dealers, investment advisors, credit unions, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae.
Institutions with under $1 billion in assets are exempt. Id. § 956(e)(2), (f), 124
Stat. at 1906.
105. Id. at § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905.
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inappropriate risks,”106 presumably by encouraging individual
bankers to pursue projects that are personally lucrative but
organizationally or socially damaging. These concerns107 echo those
of the Financial Stability Board, discussed in the next Section.
C. The Financial Stability Board (FSB)
To date, international agreements between financial regulators
have largely driven the movement to regulate banker pay. In
particular, most of what U.S. and E.U. regulators have done is
implement agreements reached by the Financial Stability Board,
composed of central bankers and regulators from the wealthier
nations and charged with developing policy responses to the
financial crisis.108
International regulatory consensus has long driven banking
regulation. Because capital is mobile, bankers and nations seek to
level the playing field between different jurisdictions. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision109 aims to regulate bank
capital110 under a cooperative vision of international law:

106. Dodd–Frank Act, § 956(b), 124 Stat. at 1905.
107. In April 2011, U.S. financial regulators proposed rules implementing
section 956. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170
(proposed Apr. 14, 2011). These regulations largely follow June 2010 regulations
but, following Dodd–Frank, do expand the scope of firms whose compensation is
regulated. The June 2010 guidance applies to the most important class of financial
firms: banks and bank holding companies. See 75 Fed. Reg. at 36,398. Dodd–
Frank section 956 extends the regulatory reach to broker dealers, investment
advisors, credit unions, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, while exempting
institutions with under $1 billion in assets. See Dodd–Frank Act § 956(e)(2), (f),
124 Stat. at 1906.
108. See History, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.financialstabilityboard.org
/about/history.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
109. The Basel Committee is composed of central bankers from the G-20 and a
few other rich countries. The European Union has its own seat at the G-20 but not
at Basel. The remaining 19 nations all participate in Basel, as do Belgium, Hong
Kong, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
See generally History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (last visited Mar. 14,
2013).
110. The Basel capital requirements limit bank leverage. Unlike traditional
measures of leverage deployed in financial analysis, bank capital requirements
reflect the riskiness of assets. Compare, e.g., THOMAS R. ROBINSON ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 259, 288–91 (2009)
(describing measures of solvency and leverage used in financial analysis), with
Douglas J. Elliot, The Importance of Capital, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.brookings .edu/research/papers/2010/01/29-capital-elliott (describing
bank capital).
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The Committee does not possess any formal supranational
supervisory authority, and its conclusions do not, and were
never intended to, have legal force. Rather, it formulates
broad supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends
statements of best practice in the expectation that individual
authorities will take steps to implement them through
detailed arrangements—statutory or otherwise—which are
best suited to their own national systems. In this way, the
Committee encourages convergence towards common
approaches and common standards without attempting
detailed harmonisation of member countries’ supervisory
techniques.111
The actual Basel standards of capital regulation clearly fell short
during the financial crisis, prompting newer and tougher
standards.112 Basel has been fairly successful, however, at achieving
harmonization, with most nations adopting some form of the Basel
accords.113
This success inspired the G-20 nations to task a similar body, the
Financial Stability Board, with responding to the financial crisis.
Mostly the same countries comprise the FSB and the Basel
Committee, although the FSB includes financial regulators (like the
SEC) and some nongovernmental organizations (like the IMF) in
addition to the central bankers who meet on Basel.114 With this
background, we turn now to the substance of the FSB’s work.
D. FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices
1. The Risk-Management Criticism of Incentive Compensation
Consider the following exaggerated example on risk-seeking
incentives. Suppose you could make a bet—with your employer’s
money—that the stock market will go up next month. If you are
right, your employer makes $1 billion, and you get a nice bonus of
$10 million. If you are wrong, your employer loses $1 billion, and
you get fired but could probably land a job at a slightly lesser firm.
111. See History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, supra note 109.
112. Cf. supra Part II.C.2 (discussing capital adequacy rules in context of
banking regulation).
113. See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—
and Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2010).
114. Compare FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 4 (listing regulators and nations
represented on FSB), with About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (listing
central banks represented on Basel Committee).
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Even without the prospect of new employment, many (probably
most) people would risk their jobs on a bet that could deliver a few
million dollars. Bankers (greedy and otherwise) are different only
because they have the opportunity.
Bank executives have long understood that bonus-seeking
employees could take on too much risk and “blow up,” seriously
damage, or bankrupt the company. In 1995, rogue trader Nick
Leeson bankrupted Barings, one of England’s oldest and most
storied banks.115 The 2008 counterpart occurred at the Financial
Products Group of AIG. AIG is primarily a traditional insurer, but
Financial Products sold credit-default swap (CDS) contracts,
essentially an insurance policy against the default of some other
financial instrument like a bond. AIG, of course, collected premiums
for writing the CDS contracts. Until 2008, default on the underling
bonds was a remote and contingent event, making the transactions
appear very profitable.
These profits enriched the Financial Products employees with
average compensation of over $1 million per year, giving them
every reason to sell more and more CDS contracts. The employees,
however, are not on the hook for any losses should the covered
bonds default. Because Financial Products was a small corner of
AIG—employing a few hundred of AIG’s 100,000 employees—top
executives were ill-equipped to control the risks presented by the
CDS contracts. Once the financial crisis struck, only a federal
bailout of $85 billion saved AIG from bankruptcy.116 Thus,
incentive compensation gave Financial Products employees an
incentive to pursue risk. Success gave the employees large bonuses,
while failure dispersed economic hardship through society.
According to many, incentive compensation significantly
contributed to the financial crisis.117
2. Alignment of Incentive Compensation with Risk Management
Reforming incentive compensation has become the primary
work of the Financial Stability Board. The most influential work on
regulating banker pay is the FSB’s Principles for Sound
Compensation Practices118 (the Principles). In the view of the FSB,
incentive compensation contributed to the financial crisis because it
115. See HULL, supra note 17, at 782.
116. See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Insurer’s Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business
/28melt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
117. See supra Part I.
118. FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1.
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was not coordinated with risk management.119 The following
example illustrates this failure:
Imagine two employees whose activity generates the same
short-run profit for the firm. One is a trader who ends each
day with no positions and thus who exposes the firm to
losses only during the trading day. Another is an originator
of long-term, on-balance-sheet assets that provide substantial
fees at origination but that expose the firm to substantial risk
of loss over the life of the asset. Many compensation
systems would tend to reward the two employees similarly,
other things being equal, because there would be no “risk
charge” applied to the short-term profits generated by the
second employee.120
Risk-management systems did constrain employees before the
crisis by disallowing some trades and projects.121 Risk management
was about the scope of permissible activities and limited the array of
transactions that employees could take on behalf of their firms.
Within the set of approved transactions, however, employee
compensation was measured by profit. Returning to the FSB
example, assume that an employee receives permission to transact as
either a short-term trader or a long-term originator. All other things
being equal, the employee would pursue transactions as an
originator because illiquid, long-term, risky transactions tend to
produce higher profits. The Principles aim to correct this employeelevel bias by requiring firms to make incentive compensation
sensitive to risk.
In the view of the Principles, the true failure at AIG and
elsewhere was that incentive compensation was not adjusted to
reflect the risk taken on by employees.122 The trick, however, is
devising an effective way to do so. Quantitative models (like “value
at risk” and its variants) exist for many transactions, allowing firms
to impose upfront risk charges. These models do not perform well in
times of distress, the only time they really matter.123 Human
judgment seems little better at predicting crisis. We need only recall
the choir of prominent voices that, before September 2008,
119. See id. at 1.
120. See id. at 8.
121. See generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic
Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 208–09 (2009) (discussing internal controls
and their failure to prevent the financial crisis).
122. See id. at 8.
123. See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT
OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (1st ed. 2007).
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downplayed the impact of subprime mortgages, the housing
collapse, and the credit crunch on the overall economy.124
The soft, standards-based approach of the FSB’s Principles
would seem to reflect these difficulties. They are flexible and
sensible in the abstract. No one could seriously argue against the
propositions that
[c]ompensation systems should link the size of the bonus
pool to the overall performance of the firm. Employees’
incentive payments should be linked to the contribution of
the individual and business to such performance. Bonuses
should diminish or disappear in the event of poor firm,
divisional or business unit performance.125
Where reliable quantitative methods can measure risk-taking,
bonuses can be adjusted ex ante.
Whether reliable quantitative methods actually exist depends on
the context. Some risks are easier to evaluate ex ante than others. If
firms cannot evaluate risks ex ante, they must adjust bonuses ex post
after risks materialize. Firms might defer bonuses, subjecting them
to reduction or malus (as opposed to bonus) if the risks taken by the
employee sour.126 Alternatively, firms could pay bonuses in firm
equity so that ultimate payoff reflects overall firm performance. The
Principles recognize the limits of these methods, especially with the
use of firm equity. Employees may just want to get their equity
awards and may realize that their individual risk-taking will have
little effect on overall firm performance. Indeed, equity (especially
options on employer stock) offers asymmetric returns that could
even encourage risk-taking.127
Given the flexibility of the Principles, we should ask whether
compensation is even a necessary subject of regulation. After all, the
goal is not to regulate compensation per se, but rather to regulate the
risk of financial distress. If firms can regulate risk in alternative
ways—for example, by holding more capital or by hedging—can
124. Cf., e.g., Austan Goolsbee, ‘Irresponsible’ Mortgages Have Opened
Doors to Many of the Excluded, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2007) http://www
.nytimes.com/2007 /03/29/business/29scene.html (arguing that, with subprime
lending, “the mortgage market has become more perfect, not more irresponsible”).
125. FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 3.
126. According to the new language of compensation reform, a malus is a
forfeiture of amounts that were previously earned but as of yet unpaid. A
clawback, in contrast, is the return of amounts that were previously paid. See
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RANGE OF METHODOLOGIES FOR RISK
AND PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT OF REMUNERATION 38 (2011), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs194.pdf.
127. Id. at 10–11.
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they simply ignore compensation? The Principles answer no,128
holding that compensation reform is necessary to prevent employees
from manipulating the quantitative risk management. Yet, if
employees can exploit traditional risk management, surely they can
also exploit the flexible standards of the Principles. Perhaps the FSB
believes that their Principles will actually change firms’ cultures129
by ensuring that risk management affects the most salient measure
of banker performance—compensation.
3. Governance by Boards, Regulators, and Stakeholders
The Principles envision compensation structures being overseen
by boards, financial regulators, and “stakeholders” (like
shareholders). Implicitly, the FSB is responding to the concern that
bankers are setting their own pay without oversight from those
constituents who will bear the consequences. These governance
standards regulate process, not results, much like the “procedural
prudence” required by fiduciary law.130 Boards of directors, not
management, must have primary control over compensation, which
they must review regularly.131 The breadth of board oversight
extends beyond executive compensation and reaches all employees
who could affect firm risk.132
While boards must establish and regularly review incentivecompensation programs, they cannot actually administer them.
Those who do must have the appropriate authority, independence,
and expertise. One fear is that bonus-maximizing bankers will cow
risk-managers into altering their judgments. In response, the
Principles require that banks hire competent risk-control employees
who are paid appropriately and allowed to act independently of
front-office bankers.133
Regulators, along with boards, must review compensation. The
Principles say, “[W]hen the totality of a firm’s compensation
practices are less than sound, supervisors should first exercise
suasion on the affected firm, and in the absence of necessary
improvement should consider escalation to firmer intervention,
128. Id. at 8.
129. For a popular examination of firm culture on Wall Street leading up to the
financial crisis, see GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A
SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND
UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE (2009).
130. Cf. PAMELA D. PERDUE, QUALIFIED PENSION & PROFIT SHARING PLANS ¶
3.08[2][b] (2012) (describing ERISA procedural prudence).
131. FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 2.
132. Id. at 6.
133. Id.
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which may include increased capital requirements.”134
Stakeholders—shareholders, counterparties, depositors, auditors and
analysts—should receive disclosures about firm compensation
according to the Principles, which also expect “engagement” with
stakeholders without specifying details.135
Like the risk-management Principles, the governance Principles
are flexible, commonsensical, and unlikely to affect actors determined
not to be affected. Were they effective, it is unclear what they would
achieve because they fail to provide clear vision of whose interests are
being safeguarded. They note that the financial crisis “revealed that
many firms took actions that were inconsistent with their own goals
and externally determined risk appetite.”136 Similarly, the Principles
argue for more “oversight and engagement” by “the firm’s
stakeholders, particularly shareholders.”137 Elsewhere, the Principles
suggest that firms follow some objectively prudent level of risk,
referring to the “excessive risk taking”138 that contributed to the
financial crisis.
E. FSB Implementation Standards
The Principles do not impose pay caps, nor do they require
compensation to be paid in any particular form.139 For the most part,
they leave firms free to decide for themselves how to align risk
management and incentive compensation, although the Principles
do specify factors of particular concern. Six months after publishing
the original Principles, however, the FSB took a more stringent
stance with its Implementation Standards.140
Most notably, the Implementation Standards require firms to
defer between 40% and 60% of banker bonuses over at least three
years. Firms may use a form of “graded vesting” to pay the deferred
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id. at 13.
138. See id. at 1 (“High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to
employees without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their
firms. These perverse incentives amplified the excessive risk-taking that severely
threatened the global financial system . . . .”); id. (“The Principles are intended to
reduce incentives towards excessive risk taking that may arise from the structure
of compensation schemes.”); id. at 12 (“[T]he asymmetry of bonus practice
encourages taking of excessive risk. It also reduces the incentive to draw attention
to excessive risk taking by others, since the sensitivity of the employee’s
compensation to losses caused by others is reduced.” (footnote omitted)).
139. Id. at 1 (stating that the Principles are “not intended to prescribe particular
designs or levels of individual compensation. One size does not fit all . . . .”).
140. FSB IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS, supra note 6.

952

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

bonuses (i.e., 1/3 after one year, 1/2 of the remainder after two
years, and the full remainder after three years). Moreover, firms
must pay at least 50% of bonuses in the form of firm equity, subject
to an appropriate retention policy.141
The Implementation Standards comprise five scant pages, only
one of which is devoted to the deferral and firm-equity
requirements. Based on the Principles, however, it is clear that the
requirements are motivated by the idea of risk management and
alignment. Deferred compensation is particularly well suited to exante adjustments to reflect individual performance—malus as
opposed to bonus142—although such adjustments are not expressly
required by the Implementation Standards. At least in the U.S.,
deferred compensation takes the form of an “unsecured promise to
pay,” arguably giving senior management the incentive to avoid
default. This Article criticizes the new emphasis on deferred and
other debt-based compensation.143
F. U.S. and E.U. Implementation of Compensation Reform
U.S. and E.U. regulators have largely adopted the FSB’s original
Principles. Thus, incentive compensation must balance risk and
reward, be compatible with risk management, and be supported by
strong governance and oversight.144 Acting pursuant to its authority
under Dodd–Frank, U.S. regulators have proposed extending their
regulation of incentive compensation to certain nonbank financial
firms.145
The U.S. and E.U. differ, however, on their adoption of the more
binding Implementation Standards of the FSB. The E.U. has fully
adopted them (and perhaps gone even further).146 In contrast, U.S.
regulators have watered down the Implementation Standards,147

141. Id. at 3.
142. See supra note 126.
143. See infra Part V.
144. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 70 Fed. Reg.
36,395, 36,405 (June 25, 2010); COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS,
GUIDELINES ON REMUNERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICE (2010), available at
http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards%20and%20Guideli
nes/2010/Remuneration/Guidelines.pdf.
145. See Dodd–Frank Act § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905–06; Incentive-Based
Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170 (Apr. 14, 2011).
146. See generally Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 3, at 476–79.
147. See Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. at
21,170.
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forcing only the top executives at large financial firms148 to defer half
of all of their incentive-based compensation and not requiring any
equity compensation.149 Deferral would need to be over at least three
years, “with the release of deferred amounts to occur no faster than on
a pro rata basis.”150 For example, an initial deferral of $150,000 could
be repaid at $50,000 per year. E.U. regulators have faulted their U.S.
counterparts for failing to adopt the Implementation Standards.151
The U.S. proposal contains a vague requirement that the deferral
be adjusted “to reflect actual losses or other measures or aspects of
performance that are realized or become better known during the
deferral period.”152 The regulators do not specify whose performance
matters, although presumably it is the entire firm’s because deferral
targets only senior executives. Thus, the requirement seems to support
deferral in the form of firm equity, arguably increasing the risk-taking
incentives that many believe plague banker pay in the first place.153
IV. MORAL HAZARD AND COMPENSATION REFORM
A. Moral Hazard Versus Systemic Risk
This Article has previously noted the tension—even conflict—
between the interests of bank investors and society.154 Because of
systemic risk, financial distress at banks imposes extraordinary costs
on society at large that are not internalized by investors. To avoid
systemic risk, governments not only regulate banks but also extend a
safety net, providing liquidity, insuring depositors, and often bailing
out creditors.155 This safety net, however, creates its own problem.
Because bank creditors (including depositors) receive public
support, they are indifferent or at least not sensitive enough to the
risk of failure. Shareholders reap the entire upside gain from success
and thus will seek out projects with greater risk because they are left
unchecked by creditors. Prior scholars argue that the cure for this

148. For this purpose, large means a bank having assets of at least $50 billion,
the same threshold that Dodd–Frank uses in applying the bulk of its important
provisions. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 21,194.
151. See Peter Spiegel, EU Warns US to Speed Up Bank Reform, FIN. TIMES,
June 1, 2011.
152. Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170
passim (Apr. 14, 2011)
153. See infra Part VI.D.
154. See supra Part II.B.
155. See supra Part II.C.
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moral hazard is paying bankers with firm debt rather than firm
equity.156
Thus, moral hazard is a cost (perhaps the largest) of the
government’s efforts to combat systemic risk. It is not systemic risk
itself. At first, the distinction may seem like fussing over
nomenclature. Why should we care to distinguish systemic risk and
moral hazard when our goal is financial stability, not an accurate
dictionary? Later, this Article discusses why the difference is
important to the regulation of compensation.157 The rest of this Part,
however, will more closely examine the problem of moral hazard
and how it relates to past proposals to regulate banker pay.
B. Financial Background
1. Investing Versus Financing
In broad terms, firms (nonbanks included) make two important
financial decisions: investing and financing. Consider a nonbank,
Apple Inc., and its decision to make various computers and gadgets
like the iPhone. These are all investing decisions of Apple.
Likewise, individuals pursue investments (sometimes called
projects) like a legal education or a home purchase in the hopes of
bettering themselves.
Apple needed money to undertake the iPhone project, leading to
the financing decision. Apple has been very profitable over the years
and has ample retained earnings in its treasury to finance (or fund)
even large projects like the iPhone.158 If Apple did not have these
riches on hand, it could have financed the iPhone project by selling
stock or borrowing. Again, individuals finance their projects
similarly. One might borrow to buy a legal education or house (debt
financing) or one might pay for them outright right if able to do so
(equity financing).
In theory, a firm approaches the investing and financing
decisions independently. A firm is like a pie, the total value of
which is defined by its assets. Wise investing and successful
products make the pie bigger. Financing decisions simply divide the
pie between different stakeholders (debt, equity, etc.). The goal of
firm management is to maximize shareholder returns, and
management does so by putting assets to good use, pursuing projects
156. See infra Part IV.D.
157. See infra Part V.A.2.
158. See APPLE INC., FORM 10-Q at 3 (Dec. 25, 2010) (reporting retained
earnings of more than $43 billion), available at http://investor.apple.com/investor
Kit.cfm (follow “Form 10-Q 12/25/10 – view online” hyperlink).
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that offer returns superior to those found elsewhere in the capital
market.159
In the real world, however, financing decisions can make the pie
bigger (or smaller). Public corporations in all industries have a tax
incentive to finance with debt (which produces deductible interest)
rather than equity (which can deduct interest from debt but not
dividends). Balanced against this incentive are the possible
economic losses that come from financial distress.
2. An Example Comparing Return on Assets and Return on
Equity
Reformers and defenders of executive-compensation practices
usually agree on the goal of maximizing shareholder value.160 In
theory and perhaps in practice, corporations seek to maximize
shareholder welfare. Shareholder wealth, however, is merely a
proxy for societal wealth. Corporations are “efficient” (or wealth
maximizing) when they pursue optimal investments that produce the
highest return (adjusted for risk) for all investors. From the
perspective of society, then, corporations are doing a good job when
they maximize the risk-adjusted return on assets.
Because of limited liability, shareholders have a well-known
incentive to seek out risk.161 Consider a stylized firm that has a finite
(say, one year) existence. To simplify matters, let us assume that the
debt bears an expected return of zero and that the firm must choose
between the following one-year projects, both of which require $100
to pursue:
• Project Surefire grows to $102 in one year. The expected
return on assets equals 2% and is risk free.
• Project Roulette has a 50% chance of falling to $80 and a
50% chance of growing to $120 in one year. The expected
return on assets equals 0% and is risky.162
From the perspective of society, Project Surefire is patently
superior. It has a higher expected return on assets and lower risk
than Project Roulette. If the firm had no debt, it would pursue
159. See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 15
(2006).
160. Cf. Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the
Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95
MINN. L. REV. 846, 847–48 (2011) (contrasting the defenders’ theory of optimal
contacting with the critics’ theory of board capture).
161. See Okamato & Edwards, supra note 3, at 168 (citation omitted) (citing
Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 251–52).
162. This example will be used throughout this Article.
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Project Surefire because shareholders bear the full risk of loss from
Project Roulette.
By adding debt (also called leverage), equity holders still control
the choice between the two projects but no longer bear the full risk
of loss. Opportunistic shareholders might now prefer the inferior
Project Roulette. Suppose that our firm is financed with $90 of debt
and $10 of equity.
• Project Surefire offers a very handsome risk-free return on
equity of 20%. The $102 in future assets would be divided
$90 to debt and $12 to equity.
• Project Roulette might be even better from the perspective of
equity. If Project Roulette wins, the $120 goes $90 to debt
and $30 to equity, producing a return on equity of 200%. If
Project Roulette losses, all $80 goes to debt, producing a
100% loss on equity. Thus, expected return on equity is
50%.
We do not know for sure whether the equity would pursue
Project Roulette. We would need to know something about the
subjective risk preferences of the holders of equity and their ability
to diversify. Nevertheless, we should be worried that Project
Roulette is still in the running when pitted against the clearly
superior Project Surefire.
Project Roulette is a potential winner for holders of equity only
if they can impose uncompensated losses on debt. Creditors
understand this incentive to risk-taking. Before lending, creditors
will seek higher interest, shareholder guarantees, and bond
covenants to ensure repayment. Informed and protected creditors
will not allow themselves to bear uncompensated losses from
Project Roulette.163 In our example, creditors would either decline to
fund the firm if it pursues Project Roulette or demand higher interest
as compensation.164
Either way, creditors suck all of the fun out of Project Roulette.
Our firm will have to settle for boring but profitable Project Surefire
when disciplined by financial markets. From a societal perspective,
163. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, The Credit
Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 641–42 (2009)).
164. In order to maintain an expected return of zero, our creditors would need
to demand interest of 11.11%. Recall that creditors invest $90, and they need to
expect repayment of $90. If Project Roulette loses, they receive only $80. If it
wins, they receive $90 plus interest of $10 for a total of $100. Because Project
Roulette is a 50–50 bet, the expected amount they receive is $90. As for equity,
their expected return is driven to zero as well. Recall that they invest $10 and lose
it all if Project Roulette fails. If it succeeds, they now receive only $20. Equity
expects to receive $10. Thus, equity will drop Project Roulette in favor of Project
Surefire.
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this decision is the right one because Project Surefire has a higher
expected return with less risk.
C. Cause and Effects of Moral Hazard
1. Creditor Protections
Of course, not every creditor can adjust the terms of credit to
reflect riskiness of a business. Tort victims, suppliers of goods, and
services are prime examples of such creditors. At the margin, it is
conceivable that firms might be able to pursue slightly riskier
projects because they can stiff their pencil and paper vendor and
other suppliers in the event of insolvency. But to do any real
damage, they need to access cash from financial markets, which are
in the very business of evaluating the likelihood of repayment from
debtors. Financial markets are, of course, not perfect, but creditors
work very hard to avoid the type of risk-taking exemplified by
Project Roulette.
Banks and other financial institutions, however, can access vast
sums from capital markets without the usual checks placed on
debtors. As noted by federal banking regulators,
Because of the presence of the Federal safety net, (including
the ability of insured depository institutions to raise insured
deposits and access the Federal Reserve’s discount window
and payment services), shareholders of a banking organization
in some cases may be willing to tolerate a degree of risk that
is inconsistent with the organization’s safety and
soundness.165
The lack of financial-market discipline is not limited to formal
banks and their depositors. Nonbank financial institutions—like
AIG and Bear Stearns—received massive aid from the bailouts.
Bank holding companies, like Bank of America and Citigroup, were
kept alive by bailouts, not deposit insurance.166 Creditors can
reasonably expect to be bailed out if the government determines that
their debtor bank is “too big to fail” or “systemically important.”167

165. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg.
36,395, 36,405 (June 25, 2010).
166. For an overview of the wide array of government programs deployed in
the bailouts, see WEBEL & LABONTE, supra note 60.
167. See Christine Lagarde, The Global Financial Sector—Transforming the
Landscape, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external
/np/speeches/2013/031913.htm.
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Indeed, the bailouts were targeted at saving creditors to stave off
systemic risk.168
2. Incentive for Additional Risk
Protected against loss, bank creditors no longer have the
incentive to check the risk-taking incentives of their debtors. This
phenomenon is moral hazard, the tendency of insurance to suppress
the incentive to avoid loss.169 Because those who extend credit to
banks do not have the full incentive to guard against risk, moral
hazard is one of the key problems of modern financial regulation.
Recalling the example from above,170 suppose that our creditors
are fully protected from loss by the federal government. They are
now completely indifferent between equity’s choice of Project
Roulette and Surefire. With the right appetite for risk, our firm may
well pursue Roulette, even though it is a societal loser. If it wins,
equity keeps all the gains. If it loses, the government bears the brunt
of losses. Not only does Roulette have a lower risk-adjusted return
than Surefire—i.e., it is less “efficient”—but it also is more likely to
throw the firm into insolvency. Thus, while the government safety
net can calm a current crisis, it may worsen future ones by
encouraging risk taking.
Taxes or other charges may be the ideal policy response,171
although practical difficulties get in the way. The value of the safety
depends not only on firm leverage but also on the riskiness of the
bank’s investments. Bank regulators may find it difficult to measure
such risk accurately. Alternatively, accurate risk measurement could
harm politically popular or influential projects as commentators
have suggested that political pressure to expand mortgage lending to
low-income communities exacerbated or caused the financial
crisis.172 Because of the practical and political difficulties in
measuring risk, regulators must step in to ensure that banks pursue
prudent projects and maintain sufficient equity (and other forms of
“capital”) that can absorb losses.173

168. See supra Part II.C.5.
169. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237
(1996).
170. See supra Part IV.C.2.
171. See generally Viral V. Acharya et al., Taxing Systemic Risk, in
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND THE NEW
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 121 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011).
172. See generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN
FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 36–37 (2010).
173. See supra Part II.C.2.
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3. Incentive for Additional Debt Financing
So far, we have examined only the incentive to pursue risky
investments (e.g., Project Roulette) and have ignored how moral
hazard affects financing. The equity investors of our hypothetical
firm have every incentive to raise funds with government-protected
debt rather than equity. To see why, let us suppose that they have
committed to investing $10 in Project Roulette and have obtained
$90 of debt funding elsewhere. As before, the government
guarantees repayment of all debt.
Our equity investors have not yet eliminated the risk of loss
from their investment. They stand to lose their $10 if Project
Roulette fails. Our investors might decide to take the government
guarantee one step further and use it not only to raise outside funds
but to protect themselves from loss. Splitting their $10 between $5
of government-backed debt and $5 of equity would ensure
repayment of $5 if Project Roulette fails without reducing the return
if it succeeds. Indeed, this scheme has no natural boundary. The
investors could invest $9.99 of debt and 1¢ of equity and almost
fully protect themselves from risk of loss while retaining all the
potential gain.174
This example supposes that reliance on the public safety net is
costless and limitless to the firm. Of course, governments directly
limit leverage through capital adequacy requirements, which force
banks to fund some portion of their operations with equity.175
Looking out for their own interests, bank executives will not relish
asking for help from the government, which may insist on removing
the executives or limiting their pay.176 Financial distress and
insolvency is not costless to bank creditors, who may still charge
risk premiums.177 Deposit insurance is limited,178 and not all bank
creditors get bailed out.179 The government safety net is not
174. Assuming that the equity investors convert a portion of their stake into
debt highlights the incentives. It should make no difference if the actual equity
investors reduce their investment to $5 or 1¢ while causing the firm to seek
additional debt financing from outsiders. The “law of one price” holds that
financial instruments are worth the same regardless of who holds them. See ZVI
BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 349 (6th ed. 2005).
175. See supra Part II.C.2.
176. See supra Part III.B.2.
177. Lawyers and other professionals engaged in the Lehman bankruptcy have
charged nearly $1 billion, borne mainly by creditors. See, e.g., Liz Moyer,
Lehman’s Bankruptcy: Tab Is Close to $1 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2010),
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303496104575560
661993488100.html.
178. See supra Part II.C.3.
179. See supra Part II.C.5.
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complete but its coverage, even if imperfect, subsidizes and thus
encourages debt financing.180
D. Compensation-Reform Proposals
Historically, reformers of compensation have focused on
reducing agency costs by aligning the interests of executives and
shareholders,181 and most of the compensation reforms enacted by
the Dodd–Frank Act purport to do just that.182 Yet, bank
shareholders may have the wrong incentives. As we just saw, the
federal safety net softens the discipline of creditors and allows
shareholders to pursue more risk and more leverage than they would
otherwise, thus increasing the likelihood of firm distress or default.
U.S. regulators have noted the tension between the shareholder and
the societal interests as part of their principles-based compensation
regulations.183
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann attempt to ease
this tension by injecting the interests of creditors into bank
compensation. Specifically, they would mandate “compensation
based on the value of a broader basket of securities representing a
larger part of the corporate pie.”184 Professor Frederick Tung offers
a similar plan, focused on federally insured depository institutions
that would have bankers paid, in part, with unsecured debt.185
Professor Jeffrey Gordon offers another debt-based compensation
scheme, although with some variations from those of Bebchuk,
Spamann, and Tung. Rather than having bankers paid outright in debt,
he would have them paid with firm equity that converts to debt upon
some event of firm distress. The proposal is similar to those for banks
to raise financing through “contingent capital”—debt instruments that
convert into equity upon firm distress.186 Contingent capital works
like a self-executing reorganization or recapitalization of a firm,
wiping out old shareholders and converting creditors into the new
owners. Gordon’s proposal inverts the contingent-capital model,
180. Cf. Douglass Elliott, Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased
Capital Requirements 4 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~
/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0924_capital_elliott/0924_capital_elliott.pdf (“Thus,
the relative insensitivity of bank debt costs to creditworthiness provides a major
incentive for banks to hold more debt and less equity.”).
181. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 84.
182. See supra Part III.B.1.
183. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg.
36,395, 36,405 (June 25, 2010).
184. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 283.
185. See Tung, supra note 3.
186. Cf. infra Part V.B (discussing contingent capital).
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however, by converting equity into debt (rather than debt into
equity).
Not all commentators have argued for debt-based regulation of
banker pay. Professor Kevin Okamoto and Mr. Douglas Edwards
argue against compensation regulation and for better risk
management.187 Professors Guido Ferrarini and Maria Cristina
Ungureanu similarly argue that reforms “should mainly be
principles-based and flexible enough to allow for experimentation
and innovation in pay structures.”188 Professors Roberta Romano
and Sanjai Bhagat argue for long-term stock awards as a way of
focusing executives on long-term growth.189
As noted before, regulators have begun to embrace debt-based
compensation by requiring deferral of banker bonuses.190 Under
U.S. law, deferred compensation is “inside debt,” an unsecured
promise to pay that exposes an employee to the same risk of firm
default as an unsecured creditor would face.191 Moreover, deferred
compensation allows employers to make ex ante adjustments to
bonuses that have already been earned.192 A trader might have
earned firm profits of $100 million in 2005 only to see those trades
sour in 2007. Deferring the 2005 bonus allows the employer to
adjust it downward in 2007 to reflect long-term performance.193 In
effect, deferred compensation allows the employer to treat the
employee like a miniature firm. Bad long-term performance is a
“default” at the employee level and forces the employee to bear
losses the way that a creditor would.
The promise of debt-based compensation is that employees will
curtail risk if they face the risk of default. Ideally, debt-based
compensation would cure the moral hazard described in Part 0,
restraining from pursing leverage and risk. The next Part, however,
187. See Okamato & Edwards, supra note 3, at 220 (“Our preference,
however, is to do so less by regulating compensation than to encourage the
demand within the firm for risk management.”).
188. Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 3, at 496. See also Jennifer Carpenter
et al., Reforming Compensation and Corporate Governance, in REGULATING
WALL STREET: THE DODD–FRANK ACT & THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL
FINANCE, supra note 171, at 493, 501–02 (arguing for “some degree of flexible,
but consistent, regulatory oversight of compensation practices”).
189. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 3.
190. See supra Part III.E–F.
191. See generally Eric D. Chason, Executive Compensation and Tax
Neutrality: Taxing the Investment Component of Deferred Compensation, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 1667 (2010); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky, Reforming the
Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571 (2007); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823 (2005).
192. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part III.D.1.
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examines the incentives of debt-based compensation and concludes
that they are at best weak and at worst contrary to the safety and
soundness of the financial system.
V. DEBT-BASED COMPENSATION EXAMINED
A. Limits of Debt-Based Compensation
1. Control of Managers’ Incentives to Pursue Uncompensated
Investment Risk
This subsection describes the limited benefits that debt-based
compensation might bring. Bank executives who are compensated
with firm equity are encouraged to “act like shareholders.”194
Unfortunately, the public safety net allows bank shareholders to
pursue uncompensated risk. An example running throughout this
Article compares two investment projects that a firm might
consider:
• Project Surefire grows to $102 in one year. The expected
return on assets equals 2% and is risk free.
• Project Roulette has a 50% chance of falling to $80 and a
50% chance of growing to $120 in one year. The expected
return on assets equals 0% and is risky.
Project Roulette has more risk than Project Surefire but a lower
expected return. Ordinary investors would pursue Project Surefire,
but a firm leveraged with government-guaranteed debt might pursue
Project Roulette. Such a firm’s equity investor enjoys the full upside
of the risk, while the firm’s creditors are protected from the
downside.195
Reformers claim that debt-based compensation would sway
managers away from Project Roulette.196 Compensation composed
of a representative sample of debt and equity theoretically exposes
managers to all of the risks of Project Roulette (both the upside and
downside). In short, debt-based compensation would compensate
managers with the return on assets rather than the return on equity.
Because Project Roulette has no risk premium, managers
compensated with the representative slice would choose Project
Surefire.
194. See, e.g., Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of
Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through
Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP. L. 413, 442 (1995) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
195. See supra Part IV.B.2.
196. See supra Part IV.D.
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Later sections of this Part probe these claims more deeply. For
debt-based compensation to work, it must actually carry some risk
of default. Yet, the whole problem of moral hazard arises precisely
because the government protects firm creditors from default. Section
B discusses whether default risk is a credible threat. Moreover,
financial firms commonly carry implicit debt (or leverage) via
derivatives contracts. As Section C discusses, the proposals would
encourage firms to shift away from debt captured on balance sheets
(like bonds) toward implicit debt that is not (like derivatives).
Unless regulators can incorporate implicit debt into pay structures,
the shift may result in even greater risk taking. Finally, Section D
shows how the incentive to earn greater levels of compensation will
almost inevitably swamp any incentive effects found in debt-based
compensation.
The remainder of this Section, however, attempts to take the
proposals on their own terms without much challenge to their
underlying assumptions. As Subsection 2 shows, while the
proposals may discourage managers from taking on uncompensated
risk, they do control systemic risk and risk taking in general.
Subsection 3 shows how the proposals do not even eliminate all the
incentives to take uncompensated risk because outside shareholders
still stand to gain from uncompensated risk (like Project Roulette)
and may themselves encourage managers to pursue it.
2. Failure to Control Systemic Risk
The problem of moral hazard is the freedom of equity interests
to pursue uncompensated risk without facing resistance from
creditors. So, our hypothetical firm is free to waste resources on
Project Roulette rather than pursuing Project Surefire. In more
realistic terms, perhaps banks objectively wasted their resources on
exotica like collateral debt obligations and credit default swaps
rather than mundane but socially useful loans.
Yet, it would be misleading to say that banks destabilized the
economy by pursuing inefficient investments. They destabilized the
economy by becoming insolvent and teetering on the verge of
collapse before being rescued by taxpayers. In other words, systemic
risk and moral hazard are different.197 Systemic risk arises from the
failure of a bank or other financial firm. To prevent such failures,
governments resort to bailouts and other forms of public support,
thus introducing moral hazard into the banking system. Systemic
risk is the price of bank failures, and moral hazard is the price of
thwarting bank failures.
197. See supra Part IV.A.
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Thus, systemic risk is the original market failure. Depression-era
banks failed and destabilized the economy without much of a
government safety net and without moral hazard. Recognizing the
special role of banking, even Adam Smith and Milton Friedman
supported bank regulation.198 By bailing out failing banks, the
government controls systemic risk without eliminating it (as
evidenced by the financial crisis). Thus, modern banking contains
both systemic risk and moral hazard.
Moral hazard is not limited to banking and arises under a variety
of insurance regimes. For example, the federal government insures
pension plans, creating the prospect of moral hazard.199 The
following diagram illustrates these examples of moral hazard and
systemic risk.

The proponents of compensation reform have the worthy goal of
curtailing moral hazard. Yet, removing moral hazard does not
remove the risk of failure from banks. Let us return to our
hypothetical firm, funded with 10% equity. Our reformers have
198. See generally Hugh Rockoff, Parallel Journeys: Adam Smith and Milton
Friedman on the Regulation of Banking, 4 J. CULTURAL ECONOMY 255 (2011).
199. See Eric D. Chason, Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls, 26 VA. TAX
REV. 519, 530–32 (2006). In this prior article, I argue that the moral hazard of
pensions comes not so much from pension investing as from the ability to
“borrow” from employees using government-backed pension debts. The subtle
distinction is not pertinent to the present Article.
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purged moral hazard from the banking system so that banks no
longer pursue uncompensated risk. Our bank now chooses between
two projects, the original Project Surefire and a new alternative,
Project Black Swan:
• Project Surefire offers a risk-free (i.e., certain) return of 2%
each year.
• Project Black Swan has a near-certain 99% chance of
growing by 3% each year. However, it has a 1% chance of
falling by 20%. The expected return on assets equals 2.77%
but poses a small risk.
Under reformed compensation, the compensation of bank
managers does not depend on leverage. They always reap the return
on assets (2% or 2.77% above) rather than the return on equity
(which increases with leverage). Based on risk-adjusted return,
neither project is obviously superior to the other, although Black
Swan offers a significantly higher return for a remote risk. Nothing
about reformed compensation would dissuade managers from
pursuing Black Swan. Unlike Project Roulette (the prior alternative),
Black Swan’s higher risk comes with a higher expected return,
giving us no objective reason to question this decision on the basis
of moral hazard. The risk–return trade-off is reasonable, and the
firm might plausibly choose Project Black Swan even if its debt
were not guaranteed.
Note, however, that the firm faces a 1% chance of default. If
Project Black Swan fails, the firm has $80 available to pay $90 in
debt. This might seem like a matter of private concern to firm
investors until we recall systemic risk. If the firm is systemically
important, its default could prove disastrous. A 1% risk of default
might itself be excessive, especially if there are other firms like ours
in the economy. Ten firms, each with independent returns, pose a
10% chance of systemic distress every year.200
Thus, the core problem is not the firm’s choice of project. Black
Swan offers a reasonable risk–return tradeoff. The problem, rather,
is that distress or insolvency threatens the whole economy, and the
firm’s 10% equity cushion cannot absorb the possible losses.201 The
firm could pursue project Black Swan without risk of default by
financing with 20% equity and 80% debt. Yet, under reformed
compensation, our bankers are generally indifferent about the

200. Technically, we do not multiply the 1% risk for each bank by ten. Each
firm has a 0.99 chance of surviving the year. Collectively, they have a 0.9910 (or
0.904) chance of surviving the year. Thus, the chance of one or more becoming
distressed is 0.096 or 9.6%.
201. Cf. supra Part IV.B.1 (comparing investing and financing).
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decision between debt and equity.202 Because they receive
representative slices of debt and equity, they have no particular
reason to pursue leverage but no reason to avoid it either. Leverage
does increase systemic risk by making default more likely, but these
costs are borne by society and not by the firm itself.
Other considerations may sway our bankers away from Black
Swan. To preserve their reputations, our bankers may seek to avoid
insolvency. Similarly, the new Dodd–Frank resolution regime
threatens senior executives with termination and recoupment
(clawback) of past compensation.203 These considerations exist,
however, wholly independent of compensation reform.
3. Failure to Control Incentives of Outside Shareholders
Compensation reform forces firm debt upon bankers, negating
or weakening the direct incentive to pursue uncompensated risk.
Yet, it cannot remove the indirect incentive of delivering value for
shareholders. Recall that the moral-hazard critique views managers
essentially as shareholders. In our original example comparing
Projects Surefire and Roulette,204 the only compensation was a fixed
portion of firm equity, which encouraged managers to pursue
Project Roulette even though it carried uncompensated risk.
Compensation reform would prevent managers from being paid
solely in equity, arguably removing their direct incentive to pursue
Roulette.
Compensation reform does nothing to affect the form of
ownership of outside shareholders.205 Regardless of compensation,
outside shareholders have precisely the same incentive to pursue risk
as our managers did in the original example. Nothing about the
analysis depended upon the fact that the decision makers were
employees. In fact, it centered on only two factors: equity ownership
and control.

202. The bankers will care to the extent that capital structure affects the return
on assets. Debt has the advantage that its return—interest—is tax deductible
whereas equity returns—dividends—are not. Debt has the disadvantage, though,
that the firm may incur costs (such as bankruptcy lawyers) by going into default.
See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261
(1958). These costs are different from the costs of systemic risk, however, as the
firm—not society at large—pays them.
203. See supra Part III.B.2.
204. Cf. supra Part IV.B.2 (comparing Projects Surefire and Roulette).
205. Capital adequacy rules do, however, prevent firms from having overly
leveraged equity interests. See supra Part II.C.2.
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Thus, compensation reform may address direct incentives to
pursue risk, but managers create value for shareholders by pursuing
the risky Project Roulette.206 Effective corporate governance
structures—such as those promised by Dodd–Frank—could even
intensify the pressure on managers to pursue risk. Managers would,
of course, face countervailing pressures. Regulators will scrutinize
firm risk and leverage. Managers could lose their jobs and
reputations by driving their firm into a bailout or resolution
proceeding. These countervailing pressures, however, always apply,
whether or not regulators reform compensation structures.
B. The Public Safety Net and the Dubious Threat of Default Risk
Debt-based compensation is nothing new. U.S. companies have
been paying employees with inside debt for decades, and the
practice is nearly universal at large public companies.207 U.S. tax
laws effectively mandate that debt-based compensation be
unsecured, nonmarketable debt that exposes the employee to the risk
of nonpayment should her employer become insolvent or go
bankrupt.208 Without a public safety net, debt-based compensation
would make bank managers think like bondholders, focusing on
safety and soundness rather than upside gains.209
However, this theory of deferred compensation did not
withstand the practical realities of bailouts. Federal Reserve
206. Project Roulette makes firm equity worth $12 while Project Surefire
makes firm equity worth $15. Return to our main example, in which a 10% equity
firm chooses between Project Surefire (sure to grow from $100 to $102) and
Project Roulette (starting at $100 but going to either $120 or $80 with equal
probability). With a 0% discount rate, choosing Surefire produces firm equity of
$12 because the equity investors are assured of receiving $12 in one year. Project
Surefire produces firm equity of $10 and enjoys final payoffs of either $30 or $0,
depending on the performance. We arrive at an initial value of $15 by simple
averaging. Alternatively, we observe that it would cost $15 to reproduce the equity
returns absent the government safety net. In particular, a $75 investment in Project
Roulette, financed with $60 of nonguaranteed debt and $15 of equity, is
equivalent. If Roulette wins, it grows by 20% to $90, leaving equity with $30. If
Roulette fails, it falls by 20% to $60, leaving equity worthless. In either scenario,
debt is fully repaid, making public support unnecessary.
207. See Chason, supra note 191, at 1667.
208. See id.
209. This vision seems to motivate Professor Tung, who would require
depository institutions to pay bankers with debt issued by the bank. Tung focuses
on depository institutions. See Tung, supra note 3. Yet, while the government
certainly did bail out depository institutions, its most important actions were
elsewhere. Measured in dollar amounts, the largest recipient of TARP funds was
AIG, an insurer that held scant government-backed deposits. WEBEL & LABONTE,
supra note 60, at 32.
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Chairman Bernanke testified that virtually all large U.S. financial
institutions were on the verge of collapse in 2008:
As a scholar of the Great Depression, I honestly believe that
September and October of 2008 was the worst financial
crisis in global history, including the Great Depression. If
you look at the firms that came under pressure in that period
. . . only one . . . was not at serious risk of failure. . . . So out
of maybe the 13, 13 of the most important financial
institutions in the United States, 12 were at risk of failure
within a period of a week or two.210
None of these large firms other than Lehmen defaulted on
deferred compensation, but almost all were saved by the U.S.
government. In a world of creditor bailouts, debt-based compensation
is simply government-backed pay.
At best, mandating debt-based compensation would implement
the vision of the FSB Principles, encouraging firms to implement
malus adjustments, reducing past compensation later in time as
long-term performance can be measured.211 Perhaps it would
encourage firms to shift away from equity-based compensation—
which arguably exacerbates moral hazard,212 but it might simply
encourage greater compensation as well.213
Dodd–Frank may make debt-based compensation more potent
with its threat to end creditor bailouts.214 Rather than bailing out a
failing firm, Dodd–Frank would push it through a formal resolution
process. The FDIC would wind down failing financial firms,
subjecting senior executives to clawbacks of amounts paid in the
two years prior to firm failure and forcing all employees to lose
210. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 354 (citation omitted).
Bernanke’s statement set off speculation as to the identity of the 13 important
institutions and the one that was not at risk. One educated guess about the 13 is
that they were JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, AIG,
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, State Street,
Bank of New York Mellon, PNC Financial, and U.S. Bancorp. See John Carney,
Bernanke’s Mystery: 12 Out of 13 Major Firms at Risk in 2008, CNBC (Jan. 28,
2011, 11:18 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41310901.
211. See supra Part III.D.2.
212. See supra Part IV.D.
213. The recent proposal from U.S. banking regulators would require firms to
defer 50% of the incentive compensation paid to their ten or so top executives. See
supra Part III.F. Firms that would pay cash bonuses of $100 million to senior
executives might comply simply by increasing (even doubling) their executives’
bonuses.
214. The overall purpose of Dodd–Frank is to promote U.S. financial stability,
“end ‘too big to fail,’” and avoid taxpayer-funded bailouts in the future. Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
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unpaid deferred and equity compensation.215 The resolution
authority, if it is triggered, would certainly force executives and
other employees to suffer. Requiring debt-based compensation
would make sure they suffer even more.
Punishment may sound attractive but could worsen systemic
risk. Dodd–Frank resolution means that executives will be removed
and will lose whatever wealth they have tied up in the firm.
Executives of modest and spectacular failures receive the same
treatment. Suppose that executives see failure on the horizon well
before regulators do. Ideally, the executives would preserve firm
value as best as they could while guiding the firm into resolution as
smoothly as possible. Unfortunately, executives might just double
down their bets, taking on even more risk in the hopes that their
gambles pay off and save their firms (and themselves). The threat of
additional risk taking may also make resolution appear complicated
and messy as opposed to a bailout.216 Forcing executives to tie up
more of their wealth in debt-based compensation would make such
strategic behavior even more likely.
If bailouts do return despite Dodd–Frank’s protestations,217 they
will almost certainly keep executives whole. Bailed-out firms
remain solvent. Outside of bankruptcy or resolution, there is no legal
theory under which a solvent firm could refuse to pay debt-based
compensation, which is simply a contractual obligation of the
firm.218 The Federal Reserve or Treasury might conceivably
condition bailouts on executives’ volunteering to forgo some
previously earned compensation, but the executives would surely
resist and complicate matters.219

215. See supra Part III.B.2.
216. Professor Skeel makes a similar point. See SKEEL, supra note 62, at 141.
217. See STANDARD & POOR’S, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SAYS SUPPORT FOR
BANKS WILL BE DIFFERENT “NEXT TIME”—BUT WILL IT? (2011), available at
http://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM223_7-12-11_-_the_us_government_says_
support_for_banks_will_be_different_nexttime_but_will_it_071211.pdf.
218. See Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
219. Bebchuk and Spamann suggest an ex ante charge on executive
compensation to reflect “payments made by the government to the bank’s
depositors, as well as other payments made by the government in support of the
bank.” Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 284. The government steps in to
support depositors only in resolution, at which time the executives can expect to
receive next to nothing anyway. The “other payments” that governments make—
like TARP and the extraordinary lending facilities of the financial crisis—are
almost always structured as arm’s-length transactions like preferred stock or loans.
The value comes from the nonmarket terms offered by the government. Even if
regulators could quantify this value, there is no obvious legal or quantitative way
to allocate it to the executives.
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Regulators could insist that debt-based compensation be
prospectively structured to deal with such contingencies. For
example, regulators could require that banks defer half of all
executive compensation earned in 2012 and beyond under the
following terms. If the deferral period (e.g., three years) passes
without incident, the bank would pay the deferred compensation. If,
however, the firm fails some objective test for financial stability,
then the deferred compensation would be partially or wholly written
off.220 The trick is designing an objective test. Clearly, it should not
be subject to management or director discretion.
Policy-makers are currently grappling with a similar problem in
the way that banks finance their operations. As noted previously,
regulators require that banks finance with a certain amount of
“capital” (such as common equity) that can absorb losses without
throwing the bank into insolvency.221 Banks, however, tend to prefer
funding themselves with debt because it is cheaper than equity.222
“Contingent capital” is a proposed method for banks to raise outside
financing. Structured like debt upon issuance, contingent capital
converts to equity upon some triggering event (like financial distress
at the bank or extraordinary public assistance). The goal of
contingent capital is to recapitalize a troubled bank before it fails
without the need for resolution, bailouts, or infusions of new equity
from troubled markets.223 Moreover, the holders of contingent
capital would become watchdogs for the firm, as they would
actually bear losses in the event of distress.224
Whether contingent capital would actually absorb losses in a
crisis is debatable. For example, several banks continued paying
dividends on preferred stock—a form of equity—throughout the

220. For this reason, regulators are seriously considering “contingent capital”
that automatically converts debt instruments into equity upon distress,
automatically recapitalizing the firm with more equity and less debt. See infra
notes 220–226 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part II.C.2.
222. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
223. Professor Gordon proposes that executives be paid in equity that converts
to debt upon distress, the reverse of contingent capital. His primary concern
appears to be that executives will resist seeking new equity capital when firms are
distressed out of fear that their existing stakes will be diluted. See Gordon, supra
note 34, at 7. An alternative reason for resistance is the signal of weakness and
stigma that raising new equity capital sends to the market. The contingent capital
model makes the executives incentives irrelevant either way.
224. See generally CEYLA PAZARBASIOGLU ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND,
CONTINGENT CAPITAL: ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND DESIGN FEATURES (2011).
Before the crisis, however, banks issued a great deal of preferred stock, which
should absorb losses even more effectively than contingent capital.
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crisis, suggesting that preferred stock does not absorb losses well.225
Proposals vary in how the conversion or write-off would be triggered.
Some triggers attempt to be objective, based on the level of firm
capital or market-based indicia of distress.226 In contrast, the Basel
Committee prefers to entrust the trigger to the discretion of
regulators.227
Piggy-backing on the contingent-capital model to write-off debtbased compensation might be feasible. Regulators could link debtbased compensation with contingent capital, subjecting both to writeoff (or conversion to equity) at the same time. To date, however,
contingent capital has mainly been the subject of proposals, not actual
regulations. “Contingent-capital compensation” probably needs to
wait for finalization of the underlying contingent-capital model.
C. Incentive for Even Greater Risk-Taking with Implicit Leverage
The aim of debt-based compensation is to lower risk. Yet, it
might actually encourage more risk taking even if regulators can
somehow subject executives to default. Recall the example from
above228 comparing Projects Surefire and Roulette. Assume that our
firm is a bank and regulators require it to fund its operations with at
least 10% equity. All other financing is from zero-interest debt or
deposits that are government-guaranteed. The relative payoffs are
these:
• Project Surefire grows to $102 in one year. Firm assets thus
return 2%. Firm equity is sure to go from $10 to $12,
offering a risk-free return of 20%.
• Project Roulette has a 50% chance of falling to $80 and a
50% chance of growing to $120 in one year. Firm assets are
risky and have an expected return of 0%. Firm equity will go
225. See Raj Date, Now More Absorbent! Five Principles to Make “Contingent
Capital” More Like Capital, and Less Contingent, CAMBRIDGE WINTER CTR. FOR
FIN. INSTS. POL’Y (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174
/cambridgewinter.pdf.
226. See GOLDMAN SACHS, CONTINGENT CAPITAL: POSSIBILITIES, PROBLEMS
AND OPPORTUNITIES 6 (2011), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/ourthinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/contingent-capital.pdf.
227. “The trigger event is the earlier of: (1) the decision to make a public
sector injection of capital, or equivalent support, without which the firm would
have become non-viable, as determined by the relevant authority; and (2) a
decision that a write-off, without which the firm would become non-viable, is
necessary, as determined by the relevant authority.” BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, PROPOSAL TO ENSURE THE LOSS ABSORBENCY OF REGULATORY
CAPITAL AT THE POINT OF NON-VIABILITY 5 (2010), available at http://www
.bis.org/publ/bcbs 174.pdf.
228. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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from $10 to either $30 or $0, offering a return of either
200% or a loss of 100%.
Surefire is the better project, but equity returns for Project
Roulette are artificially inflated because of government-guaranteed
debt. Absent compensation reform, equity compensation might lure
the executives into choosing the patently inferior Roulette.
Paying the bankers with sufficient levels of debt is supposed to
cause them to abandon the Roulette in favor of Surefire. Most
notably, Professors Bebchuk and Spamann propose paying bankers
with a representative basket of firm securities (common stock,
preferred stock, and bonds).229 As discussed earlier, a practical
problem is subjecting the debt to default risk.230 Overcoming this
problem would, in theory, force the bankers to be paid according to
the return on assets, not the return on equity. Unfortunately, the
representative basket of firm securities may not reflect all forms of
firm leverage. Indeed, implicit leverage from financial derivatives
may allow our bankers to sidestep the Bebchuk–Spamann proposal
altogether.
To see how, suppose our bank continues to invest its assets in
Project Roulette. Assume it (like any large bank) has access to
derivatives markets and can find a counterparty to enter into an
agreement under the following terms:
• If Project Roulette wins, our firm receives $180 from the
counterparty.
• If Project Roulette loses, our firm has the legal obligation to
pay $180 to the counterparty.
We would characterize this derivative as a swap agreement.231
From the executives’ perspective, the swap agreements perfectly
offset the Bebchuk–Spamann proposal.
• If Project Roulette wins, the firm’s direct investment in
Project Roulette goes to $120, and it receives $180 on the
swap. Its total assets are $300, producing a return on assets
of 200%. Because return on assets determines compensation,
the bankers receive a 200% gain.
• If Project Roulette loses, the firm is obliged to pay $180 on
the swap and $100 to its creditors. Its direct investment in
Project Roulette is worth only $80, and the firm is insolvent.
Let us assume that the swap counterparty is paid the
remaining assets. The return on assets is a total loss of 100%.
229. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 283.
230. See supra Part V.B.
231. See generally HULL, supra note 17, at 148–75. The swap is priced
according to market principles as our firm and its counterparty are simply
swapping fixed and floating returns that they can otherwise find in the market.
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Thus, our bankers achieve the same result for themselves under
the new rules as they did under the old rules without regulation:
either a 200% gain or a 100% loss.
What explains this oddity? As an accounting matter, entering
into the swap does not change the firm’s balance sheet. Initially, the
swap is neither an asset nor a liability, although later performance
will appear on the balance sheet.232 In substance, however, the swap
is a huge and leveraged purchase of Project Roulette.233 The results
are the same as if the firm invested $1,000 directly in Project
Roulette using a mere $10 of equity and $990 of debt. Our
executives are simply leveraging up their investment, using a form
of liability that is not captured on the balance sheet and is
presumably not in the Bebchuk–Spamann model.
From the perspective of systemic risk, the result is a disaster, as
the firm is much riskier now with the swap strategy. As with all
simple examples, this one lacks realism. Our executives may find
future employment difficult with such a spectacular failure. Our
swap counterparty would not enter the transaction unless certain the
government would save it in the event of default.234 If our firm
really does enjoy government support, then it would have a
systemic-risk regulator that would not knowingly allow the
transaction to take place.
The current move under Dodd–Frank to put swaps on regulated
exchanges should make it more difficult for firms to obscure their
balance sheets with derivatives.235 Nevertheless, the example and
possible responses all enervate the claim that compensation reform
complements traditional financial regulation.236 Reformed
232. See id. at 39–40; DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
1015–16 (14th ed. 2011).
233. See generally HULL, supra note 17, at 148–75.
234. Based on historical practice, derivative counterparties can expect to be the
first to be bailed out. Most recently, the government bailed out AIG mainly to
ensure that it would be able to perform on its massive obligations under credit
default swaps. Ten years earlier, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York brokered
a private deal to save Long Term Capital Management to keep its counterparties
whole as well. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND
FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 185–218 (2000).
235. See generally DAVISPOLK, SUMMARY OF THE DODD–FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 44–47; 52–63 (2010),
available at http://www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank/ (follow “Read Dodd–Frank
Summary Memorandum” hyperlink).
236. Cf. Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 3, at 278–86 (arguing that pay
regulation is necessary to complement traditional regulation); Guidance on Sound
Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395, 36,407 (June 25, 2010)
(“Risk-management procedures and risk controls that ordinarily limit risk-taking
do not obviate the need for incentive compensation arrangements to properly
balance risk-taking incentives.”).
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compensation may well put more, not less, pressure on the
traditional system of financial regulation.
As in the prior Section, the critique has a theoretical solution.
The swap counterparty is, in essence, providing financing to the
firm, allowing it to increase its exposure to Project Roulette. Just as
executives can be paid like shareholders and bondholders, they
could theoretically be paid like derivatives counterparties to curtail
moral hazard. Doing so, however, seems at odds with the fiduciary
duties of the executives because the counterparty’s interests are
clearly adverse to those of the firm. Even if federal preemption
solved such problems, firms would face the daunting task of
somehow excluding all the gains and losses from derivatives
contracts from the executive’s pay.
D. The Weak Incentives of Perfect Debt-Based Compensation
This Section assumes away the practical problems raised in the
prior two Sections. Now, banker pay carries the full risk of default
and reflects all firm leverage (including implicit leverage from
derivatives). This Section introduces the reality of variable
compensation, under which the amount of an individual banker’s
pay reflects individual performance. In short, the dollar amount of
individual pay is set by individual achievement but delivered using
debt. Using a simple example, this Section shows how
comparatively weak debt-based compensation controls risk taking,
both at the firm and individual levels.
Suppose a trader receives a portion (e.g., 60%) of the profits she
earns at her firm. The firm defers payment for three years, exposing
her to risk of default in the interim. If the firm defaults before three
years are up, she receives nothing; if the firm survives, she receives
full payment. Her activities alone dictate the likelihood of default.
Here are the ground rules for our trader:
• As the trader produces more in nominal profits, she incurs
more risk of default.
• To produce $1 billion in nominal profits, she must take on so
much risk that default is inevitable. At profits of $0, she has
taken on no risk, and default is impossible. In between,
profits are linearly related to risk. So, profits of $500 million
produce a 50% risk of default.
• Our trader is risk-neutral and is so talented and hard-driving
that she can select the amount of profit she earns.
• Our banker cannot, however, reduce the risk of default by
any means other than lower profit.
Above, I suggested that our banker receives 60% of the profits
she earns, but her share of firm profits does not actually matter

2013]

DEFERRING BANKER PAY

975

(beyond retaining her at the firm). She will pursue a level of nominal
profits—determined before default—that maximize the expected
level of profits after accounting for default. To see the difference
between nominal and expected profits, note the following:
• Nominal profits of $1 billion make default a certainty,
resulting in expected profits of $0.
• Nominal profits of $250 million produce a 25% chance of
default, resulting in expected profits of $62.5 million.
The following graph illustrates how nominal and expected profits
are related. Nominal profits go up linearly as the trader takes on
greater risk (measured by the probability of default). Expected
profits go up more slowly,237 peaking when the trader takes on risk
of 50%, and falling thereafter.238

Our risk-neutral trader would maximize expected profits for the
firm (and also herself) by taking on default risk of 50%. At this level
of risk, the firm would have nominal profits of $500 million and
expected profits of $250 million. She would receive her share after
the risk of default passes.
In fact, our trader would always be content with a 50% risk of
default. Her percentage of firm profits makes no difference because
she always maximizes her individual share by maximizing total firm
profits. The relationship between profits and risk does not matter
either: if certain default were to occur at $2 billion of nominal

237. Readers nostalgic for high-school geometry will note that expected profits
are parabolic.
238. The two key variables are the probability of default PD and the trader’s
expected compensation EC. The trader generates profits for the firm (in millions
of dollars) of 1000 × PD. Recall that default is certain (PD = 1) with $1 billion of
profits and impossible (PD = 0) with no profits. The trader’s nominal
compensation is 60% of nominal profits, or 600 × PD. The probability of actually
being paid, though, is (1 − PD). Thus, the trader’s expected compensation (EC) is
given by EC = 600 × PD × (1 − PD). Note that EC is expressed in millions of
dollars.
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profits, she would still maximize expected firm profits at a 50%
default risk.239
Without other regulation or controls, our trader would be totally
indifferent to default if she were paid in current cash. Debt-based
compensation does force her to scale back to a 50% default risk.
This level of risk, however, is completely unacceptable for a
systemically important financial institution. Regulators would force
the firm to operate at a much lower default risk (maybe 1%) by
limiting the firm’s projects and leverage. In our example, the trader
generates higher profits by taking on a higher default risk and thus
more leverage. Forcing her to fund her activities with equity capital,
however, would reduce or eliminate the risk, bringing it in line with
the interests of society. Because our trader would be willing to bear
any level of default that is acceptable to regulators, debt-based
compensation would not affect her actions at all.
This critique applies more generally to the approach of the
Financial Stability Board’s Principles.240 The key demand of the
FSB is to adjust incentive compensation to reflect risk.241 In broad
terms, the FSB views compensation as a matter of governance,
asking banks to treat their employees like miniature firms, each
bearing separate costs of failure or risk. The example above can
readily be reinterpreted as a firm’s implementation of the Principles.
The trader is one of many at a firm and is given a certain amount of
capital to use for trading. She generates nominal profits in year one,
which entitle her to a bonus. Her activities, however, expose her
employer to risk of loss at the end of year three. At least in the
structure described above, she is willing to face a default risk of up
to 50%.
Nothing about this level of individual risk suggests that
deferring banker pay improves upon the overall risk at the firm. If
she could bring the firm down by herself, the 50% risk is too high. If
all traders at the firm are pursuing the same strategy, then the firm
still faces an overall default risk of 50%. On the other hand, if the
firm’s other traders are all pursuing unrelated trades, they may

239. In the example, the firm faced certain default at profits of $1 billion. Let λ
be this level of profits in more general terms. So, the firm’s nominal profits are λ ×
PD. In the example, the trader received nominal compensation of 60% of nominal
profits. Let ρ be the trader’s share in more general terms. So, the trader receives
nominal compensation of ρ × λ × PD. Because the probability of actual payment is
(1 − PD), expected compensation is given by EC = ρ × λ × PD × (1 − PD). The
constant ρ × λ does not affect the value of PD at which EC takes its maximum
value; it is always at 50%.
240. Cf. supra Part III.D (discussing FSB Princples).
241. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 126, at 9.
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diversify the firm’s risk profile, meaning that no individual trader
poses a threat worth regulating.
VI. CONCLUSION
Practically speaking, governments must enact some regulation
of banker pay. A soft, principles-based approach, like that found in
the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation
Practices242 could conceivably improve overall risk management
and supervision. At best, financial firms would at least need to
establish to regulators that they are monitoring employee risk-taking
and adjusting compensation accordingly. At worst, firms would
have a minor regulatory nuisance to handle.
The deferral requirements of the FSB’s Implementation
Standards and other debt-based compensation proposals are
different. The best case for them is that they provide a very weak
restraint on bankers’ incentives to pursue uncompensated risk. They
do not, however, affect shareholders or any pressure they may place
on banks to achieve high returns through. The worst case is that
debt-based compensation will frustrate the resolution of troubled
firms and lead to even more risk taking.
At the risk of being overly reductionist, this Article closes by
noting the underlying problem of systemic risk: that distress or
insolvency at one firm can destabilize other firms and the economy
as a whole. Making banks more resilient and less interconnected
should be the focus of financial regulators, not fussing over banker
pay.

242. FSF PRINCIPLES, supra note 1.

